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ABSTRACT 
Preparedness for response to a catastrophic event in the United States, natural 
disaster or terrorist attack, is a priority mission for the National Guard. Interagency 
coordination and collaboration is key to the success of this preparedness. Because of the 
state and regional responses being independent of Federal deployment, the National 
Guard requires interagency relationships specific to their operations. This thesis 
conducted an evaluation of the interagency coordination processes amongst the 
Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, and Department of Homeland Security 
agencies. The thesis explores what additional procedural, policy, and structural 
mechanisms can be implemented to enhance interagency cooperation and collaboration 
between the National Guard Bureau and other homeland security agencies for domestic 
operations. Four recommendations are provided: establish an operationally focused Joint 
Interagency Coordinating Group at National Guard Bureau; organize National Guard 
homeland security oriented liaison officers under a Homeland Security Liaison Element; 
focus National Guard interagency coordination within the FEMA regional construct; and 
examine U.S. Northern Command for opportunities to fully integrate civilian agencies 
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This thesis contains recommendations for changing various structures within the 
Department of Defense, the National Guard Bureau, and the various state National 
Guards. The recommendations are improvement-based and do not reflect on the 
organizations or the hard work of the leaders who toil daily within legal and policy 
structures that, in some cases, are over a century old. Their efforts are reflected in the 
faith shown by Congress in the National Guard as detailed in the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2008. These frontline service members are serving with distinction 



























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, considerable restructuring has occurred 
within the agencies responsible for homeland security consequence management. The 
realization that a catastrophic attack, or natural event, would overwhelm any area’s 
resources has led to regional and national level planning efforts. This has also led to 
increases in resources and training for homeland security contingencies.  
Department of Defense (DoD) resources are included in that planning. At the 
national level, those resources are controlled at United States Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). At the state level, they fall 
within each state’s National Guard under the command of the Governor. This planning 
was tested during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita when National Guard (NG) and federal 
DoD elements were deployed to assist threatened and strickened areas.  
The National Guard and the National Guard Bureau are components of the 
Department of Defense. For purposes of this thesis, DoD will refer to Title 10 (federal) 
military; National Guard will refer to Guard units on State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 
duty. 
The National Guard is continuously engaged in planning and conducting domestic 
operations. There are hundreds of National Guard activations each year to support local, 
state, regional, and federal emergencies and disasters. At any given time year-round, over 
12,000 National Guardsmen are deployed in support of emergencies. These range from 
border security to natural and manmade disasters. As a snapshot, on May 24, 2007, 23 
states had National Guard units deployed for a wide variety of state emergencies. These 
ranged from security details for transportation systems to wildfires, border security, and 
floods.1 With few exceptions, the last being Hurricane Katrina, these emergencies do not 
entail DoD mission requests. Increased efficiency and effectiveness for these critical 
missions demands comprehensive interagency relationships.  
                                                 
1 H Steven Blum, LTG, Army National Guard, (Chief, National Guard Bureau). Author’s notes from 
keynote address, Military Strategy Forum, Washington, D.C,: May 24, 2007. 
2 
The National Guard has always had a traditional mission to support the Governor 
during a state emergency. This mission has evolved and includes a regional and national 
response capability through mutual aid between the states and the state National Guards. 
For example, every state NG provided support to the areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita without federal activation. Despite this response capability, NGB maintains only 
a decentralized informal liaison relationship with federal planning and response agencies 
— particularly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Established to provide command and control of DoD homeland defense efforts 
and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), NORTHCOM is 
structured as a DoD combatant command. This military structure fails to recognize the 
operating environment in which DoD would be expected to provide support by not fully 
integrating the National Guard, civilian resources, or operational aspects. This lack of 
DoD interagency operational capability also fails to recognize constitutional civilian 
primacy. This is particularly evident during state and regional emergencies: when 
thresholds are not reached to initiate a request for federal resources within the National 
Response Framework. 
DHS has begun to lean forward and coordinate directly with the state emergency 
management structures. This will insure that federal assistance is provided in a timely and 
appropriate manner. This means that DHS is frequently engaged prior to declaration of a 
federal emergency and provides support for state level emergency operations. 
Because of the routine response of the National Guard to major emergencies 
outside of the National Response Framework, the Guard must maintain interagency 
relationships — particularly with the Department of Homeland Security. Under current 
policy, NGB lacks the mandate to provide direct liaison with DHS in preparation for 
National Guard operations during emergencies. The mandated agency, Department of 
Defense (DoD), lacks the defense support to civilian authorities (DSCA) focus. It is not 
operationally engaged beyond situational awareness during disasters at the state or 
regional level. Without this mandate, the National Guard is prevented from rapidly 
providing DSCA efficiently, effectively, and to the extent necessary during a regional or 
national catastrophic disaster — natural or man-made.  
3 
A key element of interagency coordination is liaison efforts. Lacking the clear 
mandate to conduct interagency coordination,  NGB can only support DoD liaison 
efforts. This results in National Guard equities not being properly addressed by DHS 
during the planning and preparation for large state and regional response and recovery 
efforts. NGB currently has liaison officers (LNO) working with multiple federal agencies 
as well as multiple agencies, commands, and directorates within DoD. The National 
Guard LNO must facilitate the interaction between that agency and the National Guard at 
the NGB level and indirectly with the 54 National Guards in sovereign states and 
territories. In some cases, these liaison operations are structured and memorialized. In 
others, they are ad hoc assignments based on reaction to an event or emerging issue. For 
example, there is a structured NG liaison cell at NORTHCOM headquarters: the NG 
presence at Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region is borne by a single 
representative from the District of Columbia National Guard on a temporary assignment. 
The business of the LNO is always tenuous. While the officer represents an 
agency, he2 is not empowered to change policy or, in most cases, commit resources. 
Federal interagency relationships are the result of years of policy development and 
interaction. This is compounded when the LNO is representing an agency within an 
agency. The NG LNO is not the DoD LNO, but NGB is a bureau within DoD. Because 
NGB is a component of DoD, official liaison and coordination is conducted by the DoD 
LNO. This LNO is focused on using Title 10 resources requested under the Stafford Act. 
Any NG LNO activity at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is subordinate to 
the DoD liaison process. 
Liaison officers are assigned from multiple directorates within the National Guard 
Bureau. Assignments do not require screening to insure that the liaison officer (LNO) has 
the background to function in the external agency environment. The LNO then has to 
spend a considerable amount of time learning about the federal, state, and local response 
systems before he is effective. The LNO is also not adequately supported to insure that 
they are fully informed on current NGB and DoD policy and direction. This prevents 
them from providing accurate input. They often must research an issue which loses the 
                                                 
2 DoD is fully integrated between male and female staff. Male pronouns refer to both sexes. 
4 
timely opportunity to support policy discussion. Not being aware of issues underway can 
also result in the LNO not engaging an area where his agency has emerging interests. 
National Guard efforts are not being fully planned beyond individual state Guard 
planning. Each state plans in a vacuum. Then, each state requires independent logistical 
and operational capabilities. This lack of integrated planning leads directly to a lack of 
coordinated effort for the allocation of resources for the Guard for DSCA at the federal 
level. Uncoordinated response occurs during regional or national level emergencies. 
Additionally, absent a mandate, the individual state’s National Guards are not represented 
by LNOs. This acts to insulate the State Guard organizations from the national civilian 
response system.  
Funding for interagency DSCA liaison is not authorized. This lack of funding 
results in a lack of adequate staffing and organization for comprehensive interagency 
liaison operations.  
Interagency relationships are key to successful disaster response. Federal 
interagency relationships are the result of years of policy development and interaction.  
Understanding the capabilities of different agencies at all levels of government, 
and the process to access them, is a core element of emergency management. The 
National Guard is positioned and capable of providing DSCA in an efficient and effective 
manner. Without the mandate and support to operate directly with federal response 
partners, the effort is subject to changing priorities within DoD. 
The lack of comprehensive interagency coordination is counterproductive for 
agencies that rely on each other extensively during response efforts. DoD must improve 
interagency coordination and integration. NGB must improve existing efforts to insure 
that coordination results in effective and efficient collaboration at national, regional, and 
state levels. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
What additional procedural, policy, and structural mechanisms can be 
implemented to enhance interagency cooperation and collaboration between the National 
Guard Bureau and other homeland security agencies for domestic operations?  
5 
• Will a Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) at National Guard 
Bureau provide the necessary relationships for collaboration? 
• Is it feasible and legal to create an operationally-oriented liaison structure 
between the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)? 
• Can this structure serve as an operational link between DHS and the State 
National Guards deployed on state missions?  
• Will a structured liaison system, built as a section within NGB, be more 
productive than independent directorate liaison officers (LNOs)? 
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the resources found during this research represent the current doctrine 
and policies that have emerged over the decades. After 9/11, resources have been fewer. 
This literature review groups findings into four relevant areas: legal authorities, command 
and control, DoD and NG missions, and current DoD interagency structure.  
1. Legal Authorities 
Authority, responsibility, and roles begin with the Federal Code. Title 10 covers 
the active duty military, as well as the reserve components.3 Title 32 speaks to the 
National Guard. This includes active duty National Guard (Title 32 status)4. Both are 
broadly based and supported by volumes of directives and policies at DoD and NGB.  
The constitutional issue of States’ Rights as they apply to the handling of disasters 
and the National Guard will require additional research. Beyond Article 10 in the 
constitution, the preponderance of the law is contained in cases related to States’ Rights. 
They were beyond the scope of the research for this project. 
Lujan reviews the legal authorities for military domestic operations. He concludes 
that the parameters for deployment are well defined and limiting for the military’s role.5 
                                                 
3 Armed Forces, U.S. Code Title 10, secs, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sup_01_10.html, (accessed January 2007), 101-104. 
4 National Guard, U.S. Code Title 32, secs, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode32/usc_sup_01_32.html, (accessed January 2007), 904-907. 
5 Thomas R. Lujan, “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army,” Parameters 27, No. 3 
(Autumn 1997), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/%20usawc/Parameters/97autumn/lujan.html, (accessed 
January 2007), 82-97. 
6 
Ikle, on the other hand, describes a confusing patchwork of laws that dictate DoD 
authorities. These are often subject to interpretation and dependent upon types of 
emergencies.6   
The primary authorities for Department of Defense domestic civil support 
operations come from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq).7 The Stafford Act authorizes the President, upon request, 
to provide federal assistance to state and local governments. 
The National Guard Bureau Charter does not give them the authority to 
coordinate and facilitate interstate, or multi-state, deployments of National Guard troops.8 
Furthermore, the 1996 NGB civil support regulation fails to support the current 
environment. This includes interagency coordination with the Department of Homeland 
security, or the Department of Defense Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and 
planning within the National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).9   
The literature for legal authorities is somewhat dated: it fails to address the 
changes that the Department of Defense and National Guard are undergoing. There is 
recognition that substantial changes are underway, but no recommendations or outlines 
on what those changes should or could entail. Additionally, no analysis was found on 
proposals for the 2008 appropriations relative to the recommendations of the Commission 




                                                 
6 Fred C. Ikle, Defending the U.S. Homeland, Strategic and Legal issues for DoD and the 
Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 1999), 16-18. 
7 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Title 42 (1988) § 5121. 
8 Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Second Report to Congress, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2007), 123. 
9 United States Government Accountability Office, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify 
National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 
2007), 4. 
7 
2. Command and Control 
DoD largely assumes that, for homeland security missions, the National Guard 
will remain under state control. This is supported by recommendations from the Defense 
Science Board and the Commission on National Guard and Reserves to leave the 
National Guard under state control.10,11  
DoD also works from the premise that they do not fall under the control of anyone 
other than the President or Secretary of Defense. During domestic operations in support 
of civilian authorities, this inevitably leads to conflicts and negates efforts at establishing 
unity of command — unless DoD is in charge.12  
The National Response Framework requires that the Department of Defense 
provide Defense Support for Civil Authorities. This support is normally provided when 
local, state, and non-military federal resources are overwhelmed. Then help is requested 
by a lead federal agency, federal military forces, or DoD civilians and agencies. Provided 
on a fee reimbursement basis, DoD assets are only available if they do not interfere with 
military operations or readiness.13   
A clear rationale for why the National Guard should remain under state control –
rather than federalized — is detailed in the Defense Science Board 2003 Summer Study 
on DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security: Volume II - A: Supporting Reports.14 
It also gives recommendations on how to improve the Guard’s capability in 
homeland security. Schnaubelt, in his review of the result of federalization of National  
 
 
                                                 
10 United States Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, 2003 Summer Study on DoD Roles 
and Missions in Homeland Security, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board, 2004), 121-123 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-05-VOL_II.final_Part_A.pdf, (accessed January 2007). 
11 Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Second Report to Congress, 64. 
12 Donald P. Moynihan, From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command 
Systems (Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2007), 22. 
13 Department of Homeland Security, United States. Dept. of Homeland Security Quick Reference 
Guide for the National Response Plan, Version 4.0 (Washington, D.C.: DHS, 2006), 19. 
14 United States Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, 2003 Summer Study on DoD Roles 
and Missions in Homeland Security: Volume II - A: Supporting Reports (Washington, D.C.: Defense 
Science Board, 2004), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-05-VOL_II.final_Part_A.pdf, (accessed 
January 2007), 121-123. 
8 
Guard troops during the Los Angeles riots in 1992, discusses the operational perspective: 
the mid-mission change in command and limitations of Posse Comitatus significantly 
degraded the Guard’s capability.15 
The Commission on National Guard and Reserves contains multiple findings and 
recommendations to support enhanced utilization of the National Guard for homeland 
security. The Commission concludes that the National Guard Bureau and DoD are not 
properly structured to fully integrate the National Guard into homeland security. Rather, 
it presses for structural and procedural changes at all levels.16 
The literature for this section captures the current construct for command and 
control within DoD. There is no broad literature concerning command and control for the 
National Guard. The literature recognizes the command and control issues between Title 
10 and Title 32 forces operating in a domestic operations environment. However, it fails 
to propose substantial models for improving those issues. 
3. DoD and NGB Missions 
DoD has set goals: maximizing threat awareness; dealing efficiently with threats 
outside the U.S. homeland; maintaining mission readiness if under attack or following an 
attack; supporting civil authorities following a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 
or explosive (CBRNE) attack; and improving their capabilities in homeland defense and 
security (HD/HS). As the designated lead agency for homeland defense, the first priority 
for DoD is any federal HD/HS mission that they are tasked to complete. DSCA is their 
second priority.17 
The National Guard Bureau (NGB) does not have the charter, nor regulatory 
authority, to conduct multi-state and regional planning for National Guard deployment 
                                                 
15 Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots,” 
Parameters, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (Summer 1997), 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97summer/schnau.htm, (accessed March 2007), 88-109. 
16 Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Second Report to Congress, xiv. 
17 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, D.C.: 
DoD, 2005), 2. 
9 
and management. DoD opposes providing NGB with those authorities for one reason: 
they state it is solely their responsibility.18   
The DoD role in Hurricane Katrina was reviewed extensively by the Government 
Accountability Office. Findings indicated that failure of DoD to successfully integrate 
operations between active duty and National Guard assets produced inefficiencies and 
redundancies. This led to delays in recognizing and achieving operational requirements. 
Further, National Guard plans were found to be inadequate for catastrophic disaster: the 
plans failed to account for massive support efforts arriving from other states.19 Further, a 
White House report on Katrina found that the Department of Defense and the state 
National Guards were not working in a coordinated fashion.20 
One consideration for improving the National Guard integration was to place U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) under National Guard leadership using a dual-
hatted, Title 10/Title 32 command structure. This was shown to be effective during the 
security preparations for the G8 Summit in 2003 and the National Political Conventions 
in 2004. Additionally, specific troop sets would be assigned to NORTHCOM. This would 
provide a dedicated NG response capability.21 However, this concept never gained 
traction and NORTHCOM remains Title 10 forces-centric.  
Historical DoD and NGB missions are well documented. This includes failures of 
domestic operations missions rising to the catastrophic level requiring Title 10 and Title 
32 interaction. The literature continues to fail to adequately address the changing nature 
and expectations of the military in catastrophic response and recovery operations within 
the United States. This is compounded by the lack of clear legal authorities for DoD in 
the homeland defense and security realm.  
                                                  
18 United States Government Accountability Office, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify 
National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 
2007), 50. 
19 United States Government Accountability Office, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises 
Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, 
D.C.: GAO, 2006), 6. 
20 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, (Washington, 
D.C.: The White House, 2006), 43. 
21 Raymond E. Bell, Jr., “US Northern Command and the National Guard” Joint Forces Quarterly, 
Issue 36, (December 2004), 40. 
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4. Current DoD Interagency Structure 
DoD focuses their interagency effort at the national level. U.S. Northern 
Command has a Joint Interagency Coordinating Group representing 60 agencies that 
work together to prepare for catastrophic events.22 While this would appear to be natural 
for a federal agency to focus on other federal agencies, the homeland security 
consequence management mission is accomplished at the regional and local level.23 This 
requires more comprehensive interagency relationships. 
In testimony before Congress, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense, Paul McHale, described DoD’s Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for liaison presence.24 The MOA calls for DoD 
support of DHS, establishment of a homeland security coordination office, and staff 
support for planning and operations.25 The presence of a MOA concerning DoD liaison 
with DHS is further described in the Defense Science Board’s 2003 report.26  
During the past few months, significant policy change concerning DoD and NGB 
relationships has been initiated and is reflected by a few articles. More importantly, it is 
reflected in the Commission on National Guard and Reserve report and, subsequently, by 
the response of DoD Secretary Gates.27,28 These two documents, in conjunction with the 
language in and surrounding the National Guard Empowerment Act of 2007, are the 
                                                 
22 Steve Bowman and James Crowhurst, Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United 
States Northern Command, RS21322, Congressional Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: November 16, 
2006), 4. 
23 Stephen M. Duncan, Transforming the Reserve Component, Homeland Security and the 
Reconstruction of U.S. Reserve Forces, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2005), 14-17. 
24 Paul McHale, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
United States Senate 109th Congress, February 9, 2006, Committee Print, 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/020906McHale.pdf, (accessed March 2007), 7. 
25 Department of Defense, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Department of Defense for DoD Personnel Support to the Department of Homeland Security, 
September 8, 2004. 
26 Steve Bowman, Homeland Security: Establishment and Implementation of the United States 
Northern Command, RS21322 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2006), 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2006/upl-meta-crs-
9544/RS21322_2006Aug18.pdf?PHPSESSID=fa2333d6324ee8eba87780f011b06325, (accessed January 
2007), 4. 
27 Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Second Report to Congress, xi. 
28 Department of Defense, Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserves, May 10, 2007. 
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precursors for an opportunity to change the way DoD does business in the homeland 
security arena. This applies specifically to the role of the National Guard. Further 
research, primarily in the form of interviews with persons involved in homeland security, 
will form the basis for policy proposals to help improve interagency capabilities relative 
to homeland security at National Guard Bureau and DoD.  
The recognition of the requirement for improved interagency operations or liaison 
is not well documented because the findings, recommendations, and actions at the 
congressional level are very recent. These findings will generate additional exploration of 
these concepts and requirements over the coming years. 
5. Conclusion 
There is significant literature concerning the legal authorities, command 
authorities, DoD missions, and DoD policy and organization related to interagency 
relationships. However, the literature review reveals dated work that generally fails to 
address the current environment that is driving transformation of domestic operations for 
DoD and the National Guard. The current legal status is adequately documented, but 
future initiatives are not. There is limited information on the complex changes underway 
at DoD, NGB, and DHS which will drive increased interagency reliance for future 
preparedness and response efforts. 
There is very little literature that directly speaks to the need for independent 
National Guard interagency relationships or how they might be structured. Nor is there 
literature that describes current NGB liaison elements. This research will add to this body 
of knowledge. 
D. ARGUMENT 
To meet the extensive nationwide preparedness and response requirements faced 
by the Department of Defense and the National Guard, they must have extensive direct 
interagency (IA) coordination, collaboration, and cooperation authority and mechanisms. 
The failure of interagency coordination was noted during Katrina that contributed to 
inefficient resource use and ineffective allocation of assets. This led to life-threatening 




Commission on National Guard and Reserve, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau have recently directed increased IA coordination between 
DoD, NGB, and civilian agencies.29,30  
The National Guard is continuously engaged in domestic operations. There are 
hundreds of National Guard activations each year and with few exceptions these 
emergencies do not entail DoD mission requests. Increased efficiency and effectiveness 
for these critical missions demands comprehensive interagency relationships between 
NGB and DHS. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
DoD represents the most substantial resource in the United States for consequence 
management following a catastrophic disaster. It is essential that DoD be fully integrated 
into homeland security plans and efforts. This thesis will provide policy proposals, for 
review by National Guard Bureau, the Department of Defense, and the Department of 
Homeland Security, to better integrate national preparedness activities. The end product 
will support improved consequence management capability through improved 
interagency planning and coordination at all levels of the National Guard and DoD. 
Due to the currency of the issues to be researched, this thesis will also contribute 
to the literature concerning interagency cooperation and collaboration between DoD and 
other federal agencies. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis conducted an evaluation of the interagency coordination processes 
amongst the Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, and Department of 
Homeland Security agencies. A literature review, which included pertinent legislation, 
was conducted. Because of the dynamic nature of these relationships, and the lack of 
extensive literature, research was primarily accomplished by interviewing selected 
leadership at interagency operational and policy levels at the following agencies: 
• Department of Defense J3/Domestic Operations and National Guard 
Bureau J3, J5, and Joint Executive Staff. The interviews focused not only 
                                                 
29 Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Second Report to Congress, vi. 
30 Department of Defense, Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserves, May 10, 2007. 
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on current policies and practices, but also on interviewee insights into 
policy and process areas where improvements are needed and feasible.  
• NORTHCOM JIACG: Interviews explored the strength of the interagency 
relationships and operational collaboration. The focus was the role of the 
JIACG. 
• The NGB LNO at DHS Headquarters, FEMA Headquarters, and 
NORTHCOM: Interviews examined not only the existing liaison 
structures at DHS, NORTHCOM, and NGB, but also on an interagency 
task force and coordination group.  
 
Questions were prepared beforehand. The questions were specific to the agency 
and position of each individual. During the interviews, notes were taken. They were used 
to prepare a summary of each individual’s perspective and response to the questions. 
Based on interview input, additional research was iteratively conducted into current 
policy, practice, relevant legislation, and legislative efforts underway. 
Once the interviews were completed, a qualitative content analysis was conducted 
to develop overarching themes and subthemes. The themes were analyzed and several 
policy and process recommendations, specific to improving National Guard interagency 
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II. LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND POLICY ISSUES 
A review of the legal and regulatory structures and policy direction that control 
the Department of Defense, the National Guard, and homeland security is fundamental to 
determining the domestic operations role of the Guard. Legal authorities for domestic 
operations are variously described as: well defined and limiting for the role that the 
military can play,31 or a confusing patchwork of laws that dictate DoD authorities, 
subject to interpretation dependent on the types of emergencies.32   
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF STATES 
A core issue is the constitutional basis for States’ Rights as they apply to the 
handling of disasters, federal response, and the use of the National Guard. The Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution states “[t]he powers not granted to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states, respectively, 
or to the people.”33 Beyond Article 10 in the Constitution, the preponderance of States’ 
Rights law is contained in case law. It is beyond the scope of this thesis. States’ 
Sovereignty, then, provides the basis for the management of disasters. The local nature of 
the event places the onus for its resolution on the Governor of the State, who serves as 
commander in chief of his National Guard. 
The role of the federal government to deal with external threats is clearly defined. 
It is a primary role of the military.34 However, domestic threats are not so specified and, 
therefore, considered to fall under the Tenth Amendment as a role of the states.35 
 
 
                                                 
31 Thomas R. Lujan, “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army,” Parameters 27, No. 3 
(Autumn 1997), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/lujan.htm, (accessed January 
2007), 82-97. 
32 Fred C. Ikle, Defending the U.S. Homeland, Strategic and Legal issues for DoD and the Armed 
Services (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 1999), 16-18. 
33 United States Constitution, Amendment 10. 
34 United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2. 
35 Don Zoufal, The Information Sharing Environment and Constitutional Protections, (Monterey, CA, 
2007), X. 
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This raises questions concerning NORTHCOM’s role and the extensive planning 
to provide federal military forces during a catastrophic disaster.36 The issue of unity of 
command and DoD operations, concurrent with State Guard operations, is under constant 
review.  
An ancillary issue, then, becomes the authority of state officials to direct federal 
DoD disaster relief forces, and vice versa.37 Proposals have included dual-hat command 
authority for State Guard officers and, for limited operational periods, placement in Title 
32 and Title 10 status. This was shown to be effective during planned special events, but 
was not used by DoD during Hurricane Katrina. 
B. ROBERT T. STAFFORD DISASTER RELIEF AND EMERGENCY 
ASSISTANCE ACT 
The primary authorities for DoD domestic civil support operations come from the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121 et 
seq).38 Upon the request of the Governor of the State, the Stafford Act authorizes the 
President to provide federal assistance to state and local governments. This generally 
follows the declaration of emergency at the state level and, then, a Presidential 
declaration of federal disaster. The Act requires reimbursement to DoD for assistance 
provided — either by the local agency requesting the support or by the Disaster Relief 
Fund.39 
Specific to the military, the President can authorize the use of military resources 
in three situations:  
• Essential Assistance allows the President, at the request of the Governor, 
to use DoD resources specifically to save lives and property for up to ten 
days without a declaration of emergency. This allows resources to be 
surged while declarations are prepared and enacted.  
                                                 
36 Tennis, Interview, January 3, 2007.  
37 Terry L. Scherling, Maj Gen, USAF, (Director, Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau). Interview with 
Author, Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2007. 
38 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Title 42 (1988) § 5121. 
39 Keith Bea, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, 
and Funding, Congressional Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2005), 4. 
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• Emergency Assistance from DoD can be directed by the President 
following a declaration of emergency. This declaration is requested by the 
Governor and requires demonstrated full use of the state’s resources, 
including the National Guard. The Governor must request specific 
support. 
• Major Disaster Assistance is similar to Emergency Assistance. However 
the large scale does not require specific support requests from the 
Governor. This allows for a broader immediate response. 
DoD resources utilized under the Stafford Act are not exempt from the law 
enforcement prohibitions of the Posse Comitatus Act.40 
C. MILITARY AUTHORITY; TITLE 10 VS. TITLE 32 STATUS 
Authority, responsibility, and roles of the military begin with the Federal Code. 
Title 10 covers the active duty military as well as the reserve components.41 Title 32 
speaks to the National Guard, including active duty National Guard (Title 32 status).42 
Both are broad based and supported by volumes of directives and policies at DoD and 
NGB.  
When used in a state status by the Governor, the National Guard has no 
operational relationship to the Department of Defense. When used in federal/DoD status, 
the Guard role is more clearly defined under the statutes related to DoD and homeland 
defense and security. 
Key to the flexibility of the National Guard for Domestic Operations is the ability 
to operate in one of three different and distinct legal statuses. This flexibility is a 
consequence of the Guard’s dual roles as a shared state and federal military force.  
• State Active Duty (SAD) is established under each state’s law and is used 
for State Domestic Missions. Troops remain under State Command under 
the control of the State Governor, and operate with State Funding.  
                                                 
40 Jennifer K. Elsea, The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues, Congressional 
Research Service, Washington, D.C.:, November 6, 2006, 5. 
41 Armed Forces, U.S. Code Title 10, secs, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sup_01_10.html, (accessed January 2007), 101-104. 
42 National Guard, U.S. Code Title 32, secs, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode32/usc_sup_01_32.html, (accessed January 2007), 904-907. 
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• Title 32 Duty Status (Title 32 USC) places the Guard forces in federal 
active duty status. They continue to remain under the control of the 
Governor, but are federally funded. As outlined in the discussion of Posse 
Comitatus, Title 32 provides some additional flexibility for Guard forces 
in federal status. Title 32 is also used for full-time active duty support of 
the Guard during non-deployed periods as well as to staff the Civil 
Support Teams. 
• Federal Active Duty (Title 10 USC) is used to conduct federal worldwide 
missions. Units fall under federal command and use federal funding. 
Within the Insurrection Act, National Guard units can also be placed under 
federal command in the event of a Presidential Declaration. This occurred 
in certain southern states during the racial tensions of the 1960’s and, 
again, during the Rodney King trial riots in California in 1992. When 
operating in a federal role on Federal Active Duty under the authority of 
Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Guard is utilizing the same legal authority as 
the rest of the U.S. Armed Forces.  
The nature of the mission dictates the optimum legal status to utilize. Guard 
personnel serving in SAD or Title 32 status remain subject to federal activation by the 
President. Additionally, NORTHCOM maintains situational awareness (SA) to facilitate 
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Table 1. Duty Status Comparison43  
 
D. NATIONAL GUARD CHARTER  
In terms of directed authority for the National Guard Bureau to coordinate DSCA 
with other agencies (outside of DoD) or the states, there is none. The NGB Charter, 
developed in 1995, calls for NGB to facilitate and coordinate with the Departments of the 
Army and Air Force. However, it does not give them the authority to coordinate and 
facilitate interstate or multi-state deployments of National Guard troops.44 Reacting to the  
 
 
                                                 
43 Office of the General Counsel, Joint Force Headquarters, Texas National Guard, Duty Status 
Comparison Table. 
44 Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Second Report to Congress, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2007), 123. 
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realities of 9/11 and Katrina, NGB has structured a domestic operations’ coordination 
capability. Under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system, this 
focuses on facilitating interstate uses of Guard resources. 
Further, the 1996 NGB civil support regulation fails to support the current 
environment. The regulation fails to include interagency coordination with the 
Department of Homeland security or NORTHCOM, planning within the National 
Response Framework (NRF), and planning within the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS).45   
E. POSSE COMITATUS, THE INSURRECTION ACT, AND THE WARNER 
DEFENSE ACT (2006) 
The civil liberty issue regarding use of the military in the homeland is as old as 
our country itself. Via the Constitution, the Founding Fathers worked to prevent a 
standing military force in the civilian population. Within this principle, the 1878 Posse 
Comitatus Act was enacted to control misuse of troops during the Reconstruction Era. In 
the Act, the active duty military is specifically prohibited from performing law 
enforcement activities (18 U.S.C. § 1385 - Use of Army and Air Force as Posse 
Comitatus): 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 
Army or the Air Force as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the 
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.  
By DoD regulation, the Posse Comitatus doctrine has been extended to the Navy 
and Marine Corps. The National Guard, as a state militia, does not fall under Posse 
Comitatus unless federalized. This law enforcement capability becomes a core argument 
for leaving them under the Governor’s control during domestic operations.  
The legislation does allow Congress to specify exceptions.46 The Insurrection Act 
represents the primary exception. Under the Insurrection Act of 1807, the President has  
                                                 
45 United States Government Accountability Office, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify 
National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 
2007), 4. 
46 Thomas R. Lujan, “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army,” Parameters 27, No. 3 
(Autumn 1997), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/%20usawc/Parameters/97autumn/lujan.htm , (accessed 
January 2007), 82-97.  
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the authority to use federal troops and the militia (National Guard) to restore public order 
and enforce the law during “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or 
conspiracy.”   
In 2006, the act was significantly expanded by the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Following the public debate between the 
Governor of Louisiana and the President during Hurricane Katrina concerning the use of 
the National Guard, the Warner Defense Act included a section that expanded the 
President’s authority to include “…natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public 
health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any state or 
possession of the United States, that the President determines that domestic violence has 
occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the state or possession are 
incapable of maintaining public order…” 47 
This section allows the President to use federal troops for law enforcement during 
disasters other than those specified in the Insurrection Act. Opposed by all 50 Governors, 
the legislation was felt to undermine the state’s authority and expand the President’s 
power and opportunity to federalize National Guard units for domestic operations.48 
Opposition was strong enough that the section was subsequently repealed in the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2008. 
F. LEGISLATIVE REFORM ACTIVITIES 
1. Commission on National Guard and Reserve 
Authorized in the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of 2005, 
the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) was established to 
examine the full spectrum of Guard and Reserve operations and polices. Another purpose 
was to make recommendations on how the Guard and Reserve program should be 
changed to best serve the Nation. Developed over a three year period, the Commission’s 
conclusions, findings, and recommendations are detailed in four reports. The first report 
focused on Commission structure and methodology. The second report contained 23 
                                                 
47 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5122, Division A, 
Title X, Subtitle E, Section 1042, "Use of the Armed Forces in Major Public Emergencies." 
48 National Governor’s Association, Letter to Senator Frist, Senator Reid, Speaker Hastert and 
Representative Pelosi, August 31, 2006, 
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.cb6e7818b34088d18a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=0a05e36
2c5f5d010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD, (accessed March 13, 2007). 
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interim recommendations, some of which were subsequently captured in the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA) (see next section). The third report 
contained an analysis and discussion of the National Guard Empowerment Act 
introduced in Congress in 2006.49  
The final report contains six major conclusions and makes 95 recommendations. 
It is supported by 163 findings. Specific to this thesis, the second major conclusion is 
focused on “Enhancing the Defense Department’s Role in the Homeland.” The 
Commission concluded that DoD must recognize its responsibility for catastrophic 
response in the homeland and improve its capabilities and readiness for that response. 
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that the National Guard and Reserves should 
play the lead role in supporting the Department of Homeland Security, and other federal 
agencies, in addressing the homeland security role. 50 The report continues to make 
multiple recommendations concerning increasing the Guard’s role in homeland security. 
According to Commission Chairman Arnold Punaro, a retired Marine Corps 
General Officer, the Guard and Reserve should have the lead role in homeland security 
and the active duty forces should support that mission. He further acknowledges that that 
discussion of defined roles and missions for the reserves will meet major resistance in the 
Department of Defense.51   
2. SECDEF Guidance on CNGR Recommendations  
Following the release of the second CNGR report, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates released a memorandum providing either policy or legislative implementation 
strategies for the 23 recommendations made by the CNGR. The Secretary’s support of 
the recommendations is further reflected in portions of the language found in the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2008. This support is reflective of changing positions 
within DoD concerning domestic operations and the National Guard. 
 
                                                 
49 Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New 
Security Environment, Executive Summary, Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007, xviii. 
50 Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into 
a 21st-Century Operational Force, Executive Summary, Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2008, 18. 
51 William H. McMichael, The Fight to Fix the Guard and Reserves, Army Times, March 19, 2007, 
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3. National Guard Empowerment Act of 2007 and the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2008 
Legislation to enhance the National Guard was introduced in 2006 as the National 
Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act and reintroduced in 2007 
as the National Guard Empowerment Act. The Act seeks to establish a stronger basis for 
National Guard support of the homeland security mission with three stated objectives:  
1) Providing a stronger voice for the National Guard inside the Pentagon;  
2) Improving homeland security by using the Guard to identify, validate, and 
fill civil/military and state/federal capability; and  
3) Providing better integration and utilization of National Guard resources at 
NORTHCOM.52 
The final version of the bill, folded into the National Defense Authorization Act 
of 2008, includes provisions that: 
• Create a bipartisan Governors’ council to advise federal agencies on 
National Guard matters; 
• Directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to determine the 
feasibility of adding reservist staff to NORTHCOM;  
• Elevates the National Guard Bureau to a DoD joint activity;  
• Elevates the Chief of the NGB to a four star general, serving as principal 
advisor to the SECDEF through the CJCS.53 
• Legislates the responsibility for NGB to facilitate and coordinate Guard 
personnel and resources with NORTHCOM, JFCOM, other federal 
agencies, and the State Guards; 
• Appoints a National Guard General Officer as Commander, or Deputy 
Commander, of NORTHCOM;  
                                                 
52 Patrick L. Leahy, Senator, Remarks Of U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Introduction Of The National 
Guard Empowerment Act Of 2007, S. 430, January 30, 2007, 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200701/013007a.html, (accessed August 1, 2007). 
53 Jim Greenhill, SSG, National Guard Bureau, National Defense Authorization Act empowers the 
National Guard, (Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2008) 
http://www.ngb.army.mil/news/archives/2008/01/013108-national_defense.aspx, (accessed February 1, 
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• Calls for rewriting of the NGB Charter to reflect the evolved functions of 
the Bureau; and 
• Calls for DoD to develop response plans for the national planning 
scenarios prescribed by DHS and the Homeland Security Council. Two 
versions of the plan are required: one using National Guard resources only 
and, two, using National Guard and active duty forces. The planning must 
identify a five-year resource plan for the military-unique capabilities 
identified in the planning process, including a budgetary request for those 
periods.54 
Signed into law on January 30, 2008, the legislation begins a course of change for 
the Guard in the area of domestic operations. Full impact on Guard DSCA will evolve 
over the next two years as the plans are drafted and the budgeting process is begun. 
G. FUNDING 
To improve their effectiveness in the domestic operations mission, DoD and the 
National Guard (NG) require dedicated funding for domestic operations. Neither DoD 
nor the NG is directly funded for the mission. All operational funds for NG activities 
come from the state. If the President declares a disaster, there is a chance of federal 
reimbursement. Since 9/11, the NG has restructured itself as a joint entity (now 
designated as a Joint Activity by the NDAA). They are leaning forward to insure 
readiness to support the Nation’s homeland security. The National Guard Bureau has 
taken all activities for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), including interagency 
coordination, out of existing program funding. This funding is continuously subject to 
redirection based on shifting national and DoD policy and focus.  
Funding for domestic operations should be designated solely for that purpose by 
Congress. These funds should include ‘working capital’ to fund preparedness activities as 
well as contingency funds to provide resources during an emergency.55 Given the 
National Guard’s availability for homeland security response, DoD should support 
                                                 
54 Public Law, National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/C?c110:./temp/~c110MehudQ, (accessed February 1, 2008) 110-181.  
55 Peter Aylward, Brigadier General, (Deputy Director for Anti-Terrorism/Homeland Defense, DoD 
Joint Chiefs of Staff). Interview with author, Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2007. 
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legislation allowing funding for the Guard for these purposes.56 Preliminary steps have 
been taken in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008: Congress now requires an 
assessment and budget preparation for DSCA costs. 
The National Guard role falls between the DoD Title 10 DSCA role and DHS 
with the state and regional disaster recovery and consequence management mission. They 
must identify shortfalls and capabilities and, then, the appropriate funding source to 
develop and provide those capabilities.57 One suggestion was to consider using homeland 
security (DHS) funding for capabilities provided by the NG to address shortfalls 
identified in the national preparedness planning process.58 The Coast Guard was also 
described as a potential funding model for National Guard domestic operations. USCG is 
funded by DHS during peacetime operations as a law enforcement agency. However,   
during wartime the USCG is dual-tasked with Title 14 and Title 10 authorities.59  
Under NDAA, DoD is required to identify homeland security capabilities and to 
develop a budget to address them. Given the National Guard’s availability for homeland 
security response, DoD should support funding for the Guard for these purposes.60 
Funding for domestic operations should further be designated solely for that purpose by 
Congress. These “fenced” funds should include working capital to fund preparedness 
activities as well as contingency funds to provide resources during an emergency.61 Since 
the implementation of the Stafford Act follows a Presidential Disaster Declaration, the 
NG is in the position of responding in SAD. If the level of the event reached a 




                                                 
56 Rand Corporation, An Army Strategy for Homeland Security, Santa Monica, CA, 2004, 3. 
57 Scherling, Interview. 
58 Wesley McClellan, COL, Army National Guard, (National Guard Adviser, U.S. Northern 
Command). Interview with author, Boulder, CO, July 24, 2007. 
59Tennis, Interview, January 3, 2007. 
60 Rand Corporation, An Army Strategy for Homeland Security, Santa Monica, CA, 2004, 3. 
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from anticipating and providing timely support.62. One approach to this operational issue 
is to budget Title 32 funds specific to domestic operations directly to each state to 
operate.63 
In terms of legal issues, the lack of clear authorities for DoD and the National 
Guard for homeland defense and security will delay implementation of any interagency 
initiatives to improve preparedness. The lack of legal basis for funding, and subsequent 
lack of funding, is particularly problematic. Once funding is allocated, the DoD multi-
year budget cycle will impact actions. If DoD embraces the opportunity and fully 
implements the changes addressed in the law and their intent, the NDAA has the potential 
to address some of the core issues. 
                                                 
62Patrick J. Tennis, COL, Army National Guard, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), National 
Guard Bureau, Interview with author, Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007. 
63 Scherling, Interview. 
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III. DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA) AND 
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has a clearly defined role in homeland defense 
and security (HD/S). DoD prioritizes the defense of the homeland and details an active, 
layered global defense in depth (Figure 3-A). The layers include forces across the world, 
the approaches to the United States, space, and within the U.S. itself.  
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Figure 1.   Homeland Defense in Depth 
 
The homeland defense mission encompasses conventional and asymmetric 
threats. Conventional threats are an attack against the United States by an organized 
military. Asymmetric threats, or threats from a small force against a weakness in a large 
force, include information warfare, terrorism, and use or threatened use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). International and transnational concerns include the border 
control issues, as well as, securing transportation, but there is equal concern for an 
understanding of the impacts of foreign activities on possible threats at home.  
With the organizing concept of: 1) conducting military missions, 2) providing 
support to civil authorities, and 3) enhancing DoD’s partners’ homeland defense and 
security (HD/S) efforts, DoD identifies key objectives for HD/S. Two of those objectives, 
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supporting consequence management of CBRNE attacks and improving national 
capabilities for homeland defense and homeland security, are specific to domestic 
operations. Further, DoD prioritizes the homeland defense mission above the civil 
support mission.64 
Support for the civil authorities is provided as Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (DSCA). The missions are conducted by Federal and National Guard forces. 
In this case, the National Guard performs most of the mission areas shown as falling 
under the state’s constitutional authority (Governor’s Equities, Figure 1). Deploying as a 
state force at the direction of the Governor, the National Guard is the de facto initial 
responder for the Department of Defense. Arriving during the first few hours of an 
incident, National Guard resources begin to assess the damage and advise what resources 
can be provided to assist the local civil authority. While the role for the National Guard in 
that mission is yet to be clearly defined in DoD policy,  the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA) now requires that DoD plan the NG role.65 
When directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense under the 
National Response Framework, DoD provides DSCA. As such, following a presidential 
declaration of emergency, the Stafford Act is the trigger for initiating federal agency 
support for local and state requests.  
DSCA is defined as: 
Department of Defense support, including military forces, civilian and 
contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic 
emergencies, designated law enforcement and other activities.66 
Domestic operations describe missions conducted by DoD in support of civilian 
authority within the United States and its territories. These domestic operations cover a 
variety of threats or contingencies. DoD has developed capabilities and is preparing to  
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address each one. Its understanding of the potential range of threats and concerns has 
expanded. As DoD plans for the range of domestic operations and threats they may face, 
this expanded definition has positive impact. 
A key element of DoD provision of DSCA is the National Guard. With a state 
mission to provide a military resource to the Governor, the Guard deploys routinely to 
disasters. While each state’s Guard is subordinate only to the Governor, National Guard 
Bureau is tasked with coordinating and regulating the Nation’s militia.  
A. NATIONAL GUARD 
The National Guard is an element of the Department of Defense and has two 
missions — a federal mission as a reserve and a state mission as a militia (Figure 2).67 
Under the federal mission, each Guard unit is organized, trained, and equipped as Army 
or Air Force units so that they can be readily integrated into the force structure when they 
are mobilized. During times of war or national emergency, Guard units are subject to 
activation and utilization by the federal government. They, also, provide strategic reserve 
for the Department of Defense to sustain long-term military operations. 
For domestic operations, the federal mission can only occur when the President 
mobilizes elements of the Guard. They are, then, placed in Title 10 active duty status. At 
that point, they become federal troops. This is rare, but, in modern times, it has occurred 
on two occasions: in 1957 to support school integration and in 1992 at the Rodney King 
riots in California.68 
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Figure 2.   National Guard Missions 
 
The second mission is to serve the state during times of emergency — whether 
naturally caused or man-made. In this mission, and unless activated for federal duty, the 
Guard is directly subordinate to the Governor of the state.  
The National Guard must be fully capable of conducting both missions. Each unit 
must be prepared, as an Army or Air Force unit, to perform its role in the warfight. But 
today’s environment also calls for them to be trained and equipped to provide homeland 
defense, homeland security, consequence management, and domestic response 
capabilities. While the current Title 10 focus is on warfighting, the Title 32 and State 
Active Duty missions must drive reform to enable unit preparedness for DSCA.69 
The Guard continues to plan and prepare for natural and manmade disasters, 
collapse of critical technical infrastructure, and civil unrest and disturbances. However, 
they have expanded their thinking to recognize that, in the Global War on Terrorism, 
United States soil is now part of the battlefield. The Guard must now prepare for the full 
range of conventional and asymmetric threats to the country. As the world’s only 
superpower, we now face an asymmetric enemy. Whether it is nation-state engagement 
with cyber warfare or terrorists with the power of a nation-state using weapons of mass 
destruction or hijacked aircraft, we now must insure that we have the ability to manage 
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the consequences of an attack on American soil.70 Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, 
Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB), recognizes that domestic operations is all 
part of the same war. Preparedness for consequence management following an attack on 
the homeland is as important as the ability to project global military power.71  
In terms of homeland defense and security, this puts the onus on the Guard to 
conduct extensive planning and preparation for a consequence management mission 
within their respective states. Likely the largest single force capable of mobilization 
within the state, the Guard has to be postured to respond and support civil authorities 
during natural or man-made disasters.  
While their role in response is crucial, The NG cannot be a first responder. The 
Guard, with the exception of the Civil Support Teams located in each state and territory, 
is a reserve force that must be activated and begin response from their homes and 
workplaces. However, the Guard has positioned itself to exercise early Title 32 authority 
– leaning forward prior to landfall to pre-position resources to begin immediate rescue 
and recovery operations. Initial elements can arrive in a few hours. This can be followed 
by substantial force packages in 12-24 hours.72 As an example of actions being taken by 
the various states, the Maryland Adjutant General has directed that the Maryland 
National Guard be capable of providing an initial response within 90 minutes and a 
follow-on force within four hours of notification.73  
There are four likely response scenarios for utilization of the National Guard: 
1) Local response. State response for an emergency contained within the 
state. 
2) Regional Response. Interstate response to support a neighboring state, 
another State Guard under EMAC, or a similar interstate agreement. The 
recent ice storms in the Northeast are a good example of regional disaster 
response. 
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3) National Response for a major catastrophe. Interstate response to support a 
neighboring state, another State Guard under EMAC, or a similar 
interstate agreement. Hurricane Katrina is the best example of this level of 
response. 
4) National or international response after federalization. Federal use of 
Guard units under presidential order. Guard units are currently federalized 
and deployed in support of operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Of critical note, the National Guard responds to state emergencies far more 
frequently than federal DoD resources are utilized. This occurs for three reasons:  
1) The threshold for an emergency to become a presidential-declared 
emergency is much higher than that required for a Governor to declare a 
state level emergency and use the state’s National Guard for support. 
2) Guard units are in armories in over 3,000 communities.74 As such, they 
frequently respond immediately to work to save lives and property. 
3) The Guard normally responds as a state resource before the federal 
declaration process has occurred and is already engaged once the federal 
response begins. 
There is an average of 11,000-14,000 Guard soldiers serving in State Active Duty 
(SAD) at any given time throughout the year. They support the state missions at the 
direction of their Governor. These soldiers are conducting domestic operations; homeland 
security and support missions that never reach the level of federal intervention.75, 76 A 
sampling of current state active duty missions that were ongoing during April, 2007: 
• New York: Security missions and command and control at train stations; 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority; JFK and LaGuardia airports; and 
providing key asset and infrastructure protection at nuclear power plants. 
This is an on-going mission, Operation Empire Shield, that began on 
September 12, 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks. 
                                                 
74 Blum, Keynote address. 
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• Louisiana: Special response team in New Orleans to support the police 
department for Operation Crescent Guard; conducting roving patrols and 
static checkpoints. 
• California: Force protection for several key installations. 
• New Jersey: Security and infrastructure protection of key assets at nuclear 
power generation plants. 
• Iowa: Winter storm response operations in Burlington; mission is to 
provide generator power support and water missions. 
• Massachusetts: Security and infrastructure protection of key assets at a 
nuclear power plant. 
• Kentucky: Water purification for Knott County due to a county-wide 
water shortage. 
• New Mexico: Furnishing potable water and equipment to various 
communities as a result of annual drought conditions. 
• Florida: Supporting Florida Division of Law Enforcement assisting with 
assessment of Florida’s seaport inspection program. 
• Hawaii: Earthquake recovery efforts on the west coasts of Hawaii and 
Maui.77 
There are efforts underway in each state’s Guard to prepare for the full spectrum 
of domestic operations. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the catastrophic 
effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it became increasingly important that states have a 
robust response capability. The National Guard conducted the hurricane support mission 
without ever being federalized during Hurricane Katrina. Approximately 50,000 troops 
from 23 states served under the Governors of Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Alabama, 
and Florida to meet the local support requirements.  
Guard support to civil authorities potentially occurs in two mission areas — 
scheduled support and disaster response. Scheduled support can range from support at a 
special event requiring a military presence to extended operations at the Southwest 
border. For this mission, duration is typically days to months, but the border operation is 
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currently scheduled as a 3-year mission. Disaster response, on the other hand, requires 
not only general purpose forces, but also requires specialized teams that depend on the 
capabilities required. Duration of these missions is typically hours to days. However, 
there are still National Guard security troops on the ground in New Orleans.  
Central to each state’s preparation is to identify the critical and essential 
organizations, equipment, and training that would be necessary to accomplish the full 
range of potential domestic missions. To achieve this, ten essential capabilities have been 
established in each state: 
• The State Joint Force Headquarters (1) is a joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental headquarters designed to manage operations and 
receive, stage, and integrate reinforcements from other states and federal 
forces.  
• The Civil Support Team (2) provides WMD detection and advisory 
capabilities.  
• Maintenance (3), Aviation (4), Engineer (5), Medical (6), 
Communications (7), Transportation (8), Logistics (9), and Security (10) 
represent the kinds of personnel and unit capabilities that have application 
to virtually all disasters. Every state has these in either its Army or Air 
National Guards. These capabilities are drawn from the state’s existing 
units. Robustness of these capabilities will depend on a given state’s force 




Figure 3.   National Guard Essential Capabilities 
 
Under current DoD policy, National Guard units are planned for deployment on a 
five-year cycle. Figure 3 indicates that the intent is that a state always has these 
capabilities on hand, regardless of unit mobilizations. To insure preparedness for the state 
mission, the operational deployment construct reserves 50% of any Guard within the state 
to provide capability for domestic operations. This construct has not been compromised 
— not even during the time period in 2004-2005 when Guard resources represented a 
high percentage of troops committed to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
B. HOMELAND SECURITY NATIONAL GUARD MISSIONS 
The immediate threat following the attacks of 9/11 was assessed to be our 
transportation infrastructure. Air National Guard attack aircraft were immediately 
launched to stop any further air attacks on our cities. Army Guard troops were also 
deployed to protect our airports, rail terminals, and bus terminals from attack. To provide 
support, Guard units responded immediately to Manhattan and the Pentagon. The first 
secure communications from the World Trade Center site was over National Guard CST 
communications equipment. 
Since 9/11, as part of “Operation Noble Eagle,” the U.S. Air Force has flown 
more than 42,000 missions and scrambled or diverted aircraft more than 2,100 times. 
They have provided combat air patrols (CAP), random patrols, and aircraft intercept 
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protection for large cities and high-valued assets in response to the increased terrorist 
threat. The National Guard has flown more than 70 percent of those missions.78  
The National Guard has also assumed the responsibility of all ground alert sites 
and has placed troops in transportation hubs to support local law enforcement and the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The Army Guard has now assumed the 
mission of providing ground based air defense coverage for the National Capital 
Region.79  
In 2006, President Bush directed that border control efforts be increased in an 
effort to bring an end to a perceived open border and uncontrolled immigration into the 
United States — particularly from Mexico. He authorized nearly doubling the size of the 
Border Patrol and dramatically increasing their technological capability to detect illegal 
entry into the country. In May 2006, when it became clear that this initiative would take 
3-5 years to complete, the President called for 6,000 troops to be deployed to the 
Southwest border as a stopgap measure to temporarily bolster Border Patrol efforts. The 
National Guard was tasked to provide the troops. Since then, over 9,000 National Guard 
service members from across the Nation have served in Operation Jump Start. They 
operate in Guard lead task forces in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The 
Guardsmen are involved with surveillance, construction, and logistics support for the 
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). They also free up 300 CBP agents for front-line 
field operations. 
This is not the first National Guard (NG) border security mission. In the 1980’s, 
Congress passed a law allowing for military support to law enforcement counterdrug 
efforts. Each State Guard established a Counterdrug Program and established activities 
based on the state’s resources and threats. Since that time, National Guard troops have 
been deployed on a variety of missions. Primarily this has been construction and 
surveillance-oriented along the southwest border. In addition, Guard troops train and 
support local law enforcement in their counterdrug mission. This effort is two decades 
old and has contributed to the disruption of the drug flow across the border. 
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C. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU 
The National Guard interface with the Department of Defense is the National 
Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB is a joint activity of the Department of Defense tasked 
with administration of matters concerning the Army and Air National Guard. Because of 
the constitutional basis for each state’s Guard, commanded by the Governor, NGB has no 
command and control authority over the individual State Guards. However, ultimate 
budget and regulatory authority reside within NGB. This makes a cooperative 
relationship essential for the State Guard’s success. Additionally, NGB has the authority 
to publish regulations which dictate the manner in which each State Guard conducts its 
business. 
There are three directorates in the National Guard Bureau: the Army National 
Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Joint Staff. The Army National Guard, with 
350,000 soldiers authorized, is aligned with the Department of the Army and its force 
structure. The Air National Guard, with an authorized strength of 106,000 airmen, is 
aligned with the Department of the Air Force. Total authorized Guard force is 456,000 
personnel.  
In recent years, the National Guard has created a Joint Force Headquarters in each 
state to insure that domestic operations are coordinated between the Air and Army Guard 
forces. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA) has also now assigned 
coordination of states responses to NGB. As part of that coordination, NGB serves as an 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) coordinator for states requesting 
NG support. EMAC is a congressionally ratified agreement that provides form and 
structure to nationwide interstate mutual aid. Once existing memorandums of agreement, 
that coordinate the use of neighboring states National Guard resources, are exhausted, 
EMAC becomes the primary source of non-federal assistance.80 Further, the National 
Guard Bureau stands ready to deploy robust capabilities to affected states to include 
interoperable communications, operations center support, and public affairs augmentation 
to the Adjutant General and Governor. 
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D. DOD AND NG DSCA RESPONSE 
To clarify roles and leverage-existing capabilities, the NG should assume 
leadership for domestic DSCA. The state mission of the Guard is homeland security. The 
Guard has been doing homeland security since its inception as a militia and is deployed 
routinely. This state mission, juxtaposed against the reluctance of the DoD to fully 
integrate the homeland security mission, makes the National Guard the natural point of 
focus for managing and conducting the DoD homeland security mission. Even during a 
catastrophic disaster, Title 10 forces may not play a pivotal role. While Lieutenant 
General Russell Honore was the face of the military during Hurricane Katrina, he led a 
force of only 10,000 soldiers. The remaining 50,000 Guardsmen were under control of 
the joint task forces established in each state. Guardsmen continued to support New 
Orleans during 2007.81 As a further example, the concept of the Incident Command 
System (ICS), integral to civilian incident management under the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), as required under HSPD-5 and the NRF, is alien to DoD. 
While DoD is slowly learning the system, primarily at NORTHCOM, the National Guard 
is making a focused effort to train all domestic operations staff nationwide in ICS.82 
DoD’s continued resistance to National Guard DSCA leadership is repeatedly noted as 
incongruous by National Guard leadership.83,84,85 
On September 11, 2001, the National Guard made an immediate transition from a 
strategic reserve, called upon only during national emergencies, to an operational reserve, 
supplementing on-going operations worldwide. But the policies, budget, planning, and 
thinking at DoD remain in the strategic reserve paradigm.86 Last updated in 1987, the  
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DoD regulation governing the National Guard should be updated to fully define the 
homeland security responsibilities of the Guard.87 These changes are now called for in 
the NDAA. 
The National Guard is not a first responder, but the public demands that the Guard 
be a relevant, reliable, and ready force. Any discussion of whether the NG should be 
engaged in homeland security is a moot point. The President demonstrated his trust in the 
NG when he turned to them for Operation Jumpstart, the contribution of 6,000 troops to 
support the Border Patrol efforts to control the southwest border.88 The actions of our 
Nation’s leaders reflect the primacy of the NG in homeland security. Thus, our doctrine, 
and consequent training and operational development, should follow. 
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IV. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
The adage, “all disasters are local,” infers that response and recovery is a local 
issue. While the disaster is local, and the end result of recovery is a return to local 
normalcy, disaster response, in catastrophic events, is regional or even national. This 
dictates the need for a regional and national multi-agency coordination effort. 
Interagency relationships are key to successful disaster response. Understanding 
the capabilities of different agencies at all levels of government and the process to access 
them is a core element of emergency management. An agency is defined as: 
A division of government with a specific function offering a particular 
kind of assistance. In ICS [Incident Command System], agencies are 
defined either as jurisdictional (having statutory responsibility for incident 
management) or as assisting or cooperating (providing resources or other 
assistance). (National Incident Management System Glossary of Key 
Terms; U.S. Department of Homeland Security.)89 
Interagency coordination is doctrinally defined by DoD as “the coordination that 
occurs between agencies of the US Government, including the Department of Defense, 
for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.”90 Military domestic operations must be 
coordinated and integrated with activities of other agencies within or enroute to the 
disaster area. Interagency coordination is the cooperative effort and communication that 
accomplishes it.  
Current DoD strategic doctrine details four capability themes for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; 
information-sharing; joint operational capabilities for homeland defense; and interagency 
(IA) and intergovernmental (IG) coordination.91 This inclusion of IA/IG coordination, as 
a core capability theme, demonstrates the significance of this effort. 
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Military operations are structured and doctrine driven. The interagency 
relationship is not. Vastly different missions and cultures require a degree of flexibility 
that may not relate well to a military organizational structure which emphasizes unity of 
command. The key to success is to focus on unity of effort. This insures that all agencies 
are working to overcome differences in cultures, structure, and processes to achieve a 
common goal. This can only be accomplished through close, continuous interagency 
coordination, and cooperation.92  
The DoD interagency imperative is recognized in Joint Vision 2020. In this Joint 
Vision, it is a function of “U.S. forces operating unilaterally or with multinational and 
interagency partners to defeat any adversary and control any situation…."93 An element 
of that imperative is the unity of effort that results from cooperation and coordination. 
This requires relationships that are built and maintained prior to operations. Operational 
focus then becomes actions and outcomes, rather than spending time on relationships."94 
As a State Militia, the National Guard is organized as an asset of the Governor 
and works closely with other state agencies in preparation for the state mission. However, 
as demonstrated in Hurricane Katrina, few states are organized or resourced to manage a 
catastrophic response utilizing regional and national resources.95 That level of 
organization requires multiple agency response and complex interagency coordination, 
cooperation, and communications.  
For the National Guard Bureau, the task of interagency coordination falls to the 
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) within the NGB Joint Staff. Their mission 
includes representing the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) in DoD,  
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interagency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental forums. “Initiate and maintain 
intergovernmental/interagency coordination” is also listed as a mission essential task 
area.96   
A. DHS PERSPECTIVE ON INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), specifically the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), focuses on the value of strong partnerships 
within federal, state, and local agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private 
industry. These partnerships are a key support element for prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery from disasters.97  
The National Response Framework (NRF) details five key principles as the basis 
for its national response doctrine: 1) engaged partnership, 2) tiered response, 3) scalable, 
flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities, 4) unity of effort through unified 
command, and 5) readiness to act. This response doctrine “defines basic roles, 
responsibilities, and operational concepts for response across all levels of government 
and with NGOs and the private sector.”98 The NRF goes on to detail the critical nature of 
engaged partnership as a basis for preparedness. Preparedness is defined as the process of 
identifying personnel, equipment, and training requirements for responding to potential 
incidents. Through planning, training, exercises, resource management, and organization, 
preparedness seeks to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities. As such, 
preparedness must be comprehensively coordinated across the full spectrum of potential 
response partners within and across jurisdictions.99 
As preparedness evolves, it will more closely resemble integration than 
cooperation or coordination. The emerging concept of networked preparedness, that is a 
                                                 
96 National Guard Bureau, Joint Staff J-5 webpage, 
http://www.ngb.army.mil/jointstaff/j5/default.aspx, (accessed July 7, 2007). 
97 R. David Paulison, Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Reforming FEMA: Are We 
Making Progress?, Statement for the Record Before the United States House of Representatives House 
Homeland Security Committee Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and 
Response & Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight, (Washington, D.C.: February 
28, 2007), 8. 




preparedness model that shares plans, capabilities, and innovation among federal, state, 
local, NGO, and private sector stakeholders, requires even stronger interagency 
relationships. Workload is distributed across all partners and investments and is jointly 
managed to build the network’s capabilities.100  
Following Katrina, interagency discord was noted as a contributor to delays in 
response and inefficient use of resources.101 DHS uses a Coast Guardsman as the military 
advisor to the Secretary of DHS. While the Coast Guard has Title 10 authorities, it falls 
within DHS — not DoD.102 With specified missions to work together and with dedicated 
resources, why is interagency coordination not reaching its potential? At the tactical 
level, the forces directly involved in civil-military operations make it work. At the 
strategic level, one of the functions of the Homeland Security Council (HSC) is to 
“…recommend to the President through the Assistant ways to improve coordination, 
cooperation, and communication among federal, state, and local officials and private and 
other entities …”103 It is at the operational planning level where the various issues of 
command and control, resource use, and budgeting become dysfunctional.104 
There are a variety of efforts to insure, or at least promote, interagency 
coordination and cooperation. Even though they vary in degree of formality, from ad hoc 
informal associations to codified intergovernmental authorities, committees, coordinating 
groups, associations, councils, trusts, commissions, syndicates, consortiums, boards, and 
cartels, all serve to facilitate the interagency process. Depending on the nature of the 
interagency relationship and the role expected, DoD participates in these efforts. DoD 
commonly uses LNOs as a communication link with other agencies and has developed 
the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) as a formal structure to manage 
interagency relationships and resources.  
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B. JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP 
A policy innovation from the Department of Defense, the Joint Interagency 
Coordinating Group (JIACG), is designed as a lead organization within a major 
command that provides oversight, coordination, and synchronization of multiple 
agencies’ activities. These are all relative to that command.105 As defined in joint military 
doctrine, the JIACG “is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and 
collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. 
Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander 
and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG 
provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational 
level with other USG civilian agencies and departments.”106 
The JIACG is a key element in the planning process, providing regular 
collaborative support for interagency missions and activities. The JIACG is tasked to: 
• Participate in deliberate and crisis planning, integrated with the civilian 
agencies planning efforts; 
• Present civilian agency perspectives and capabilities; 
• Facilitate information sharing across agencies; 
• Improve interagency planning and execution; 
• Exercise operational procedures with other JIACG agencies;  
• Establish routine working relationships among interagency partners; and 
• Work military-civilian issues.107 
A subgroup of the JIACG is the Interagency Planning Cell (IPC). This cell can be 
organized to operate in a full-time status to provide continuous planning support and  
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coordination during an exercise, contingency, or crises. The cell can be tailored based on 
the operational nature of the contingency. An example is adding health representatives 
during a pandemic flu outbreak.108   
1. NORTHCOM JIACG Model 
NORTHCOM is the command authority for Department of Defense operations in 
the continental United States (CONUS). Recognizing the constitutional civilian authority, 
and the need to interact with the broad range of agencies that operate in CONUS, 
NORTHCOM has created an Interagency Coordination Directorate (ICD). This staffs the 
NORTHCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group. The ICD’s mission is to “facilitate 
the integration and synchronization of interagency activities to ensure mutual 
understanding and unity of effort.”109 In their role as airspace defense for CONUS, the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is integrated into the 
NORTHCOM ICD mission. 
The Interagency Coordination Directorate (ICD) is an independent entity 
answering directly to the NORTHCOM Combatant Commander (COCOM). This direct 
command relationship insures that the IC mission is not focused on a specific staff 
section area of interest (for example, S-4, Logistics). This direct relationship also avoids 
filtering of information by staff before it gets to the COCOM.  
The NORTHCOM JIACG operates day to day, supporting operational planning & 
initiatives. The group provides interagency (IA) situational awareness, synthesizing IA 
information. They conduct IA assessments, and facilitate IA reach back, both within the 
group and with the non-residential group members.  
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Figure 4.   NORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Directorate 
 
As required, the JIACG forms working groups for specific areas of interest. 
Examples are law enforcement, Defense Coordinating Officers and Federal Coordinating 
Officers, Pandemic Flu, Earthquake, Private Sector, and other interest areas. 
During exercises or contingency operations, the JIACG also serves as an 
Interagency Coordination Group (also called a “Battle Cell”). The Interagency 
Coordination Group (ICG) is the IA coordination focus point for agency representatives. 
It provides the non-DoD perspective/picture to the Commander. The ICG also works to 
anticipate gaps or seams in capabilities that may lead to requests for DoD support. 
The NORTHCOM JIACG is staffed by the Interagency Coordination Directorate. 
The senior civilian (SES – 5) Director, reports to the NORTHCOM Commander. Direct 
access to the COCOM of the Interagency Directorate is viewed as critical to its 
success.110 The Directorate is further broken down into four divisions: Emergency 
Preparedness and Plans, Operations and Training, Law Enforcement and Security, and 
Concepts and Technology. These divisions coordinate specific JIACG operational areas 
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and initiatives. A Domestic Initiatives Team addresses strategic and non-traditional 
approaches to integrating military and civilian resources and operations.111  
2. NORTHCOM JIACG Members 
Because of the breadth of the mission, the NORTHCOM JIACG has a widely 
varied and robust membership. Table 2 shows a listing of those agencies. Members are 
either residential or non-residential. All resident positions noted by asterisks are agency 
employee representatives. All non-residential JIACG members are available locally, i.e., 
within the State of Colorado. 
3. JIACG Concerns 
Interagency relationships are critical to the domestic operations mission. While 
the creation of a new coordinating mechanism within an agency will potentially enhance 
these relationships, this approach can also generate internal and external issues.  
Past experience with the JIACG concept in DoD has exposed some potential 
weaknesses. Personnel turnover and loss of corporate knowledge and continuity is seen 
when agencies rotate representatives too quickly. This has to be overcome and the 
importance of staff continuity included in JIACG agreements.  
The NORTHCOM JIACG experiences continuity issues. Assignment to an 
interagency role for a tour for either military or civilian staff is not always viewed as a 
career enhancer. This is because it takes staff out of their career mainstream. 
Additionally, personnel assigned may lack education or experience in domestic 
operations. Consideration should be given to creating an interagency career field to 
accommodate these continuity issues.112 
The JIACG will have relationships that have cross-cutting impact on various other 
staff sections and divisions of the organization. The JIACG needs to recognize and 
respect the sections’ authorities and responsibilities. Conversely, the staff sections must 
support the IA mission of the JIACG. 
JIACG membership is typically taken from existing resources. Therefore, the 
value of the JIACG to the participating agencies must be measurable and assessed 
                                                 
111 Burrell, Interview. 
112 Ibid. 
49 
regularly to insure that there is a tangible return to the work product. Alternatively, the 
work product or the agency’s role in the JIACG needs to be adjusted.113 The JIACG 
should be staffed by planners and operators. This allows the JIACG to provide policy 
input and planning work products as well as provide mutual support during contingency 
operations.114 
Operational and communications differences can make connectivity difficult. This 
is particularly difficult if the operation is conducted in a secure environment. A current 
example is the inability of the secure VTC systems of the DoD and DHS to communicate 
with each other. This difference can degrade the advantages that technology offers to 
operational planners. 
C. LIAISON OFFICERS  
Another commonly used tool for interagency coordination is the use of DoD 
representatives, liaison officers (LNO), placed at key locations in other agencies. Liaison 
is a form of communication for establishing and maintaining mutual understanding and 
cooperation (National Incident Management System Glossary of Key Terms; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.) DoD adds “ensuring unity of purpose and action” to 
that definition (Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms).115 
There are various agency expectations of LNOs. National Guard Bureau prefers to 
see “liaison” more as the function — rather than as a role. The LNO simply serves as a 
conduit for relationships and information.116 In this model, the LNO is an enabler for 
requests for support.  
Under the NGB Adaptive Battle Staff Model, the lead for the various liaisons 
shifts as the focus of the incident shifts. Initially the liaison effort answers to the planning 
directorate (J-5). In this case, the liaison is expected to establish relationships and 
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communications flow before the incident. Once an incident is foreseen, the lead for 
liaison shifts to the operations directorate (J-3 Future Ops), where relationships are 
enhanced and new ones created as required. When the incident occurs, the lead again 
shifts to the current operations group for on-going management. 117 This shift in 
command of the LNOs is occurring during on-going contingencies is confusing and 
inefficient. This will likely result in miscommunications and reduced effectiveness as the 
various LNOs realign themselves with different staff section missions and foci.   
Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) is the element of NORTHCOM 
conducting planning and command and control for DoD CBRNE consequence 
management operations. The JTF has a broader concept for the use of their LNOs. Under 
a steady state (non-response) time, the LNO is expected to cultivate, sustain, and 
maintain regional partnerships through focused engagements with Defense Coordinating 
Officers (DCO), FEMA Staff, and NG State Joint Force Headquarter (SJFHQ) staffs. 
Their role is to coordinate and collaborate between regional and national DoD forces, 
maintain connectivity with DoD, federal, state and local officials, attend key CBRNE 
conferences, and participate in special events (such as Democratic/Republican 
Conventions and the Super Bowl). Once a response is required, the LNO becomes the 
JTF-CS commander’s representative. As such he becomes a “Force Multiplier” (rather 
than an enabler) to the DCO, and his staff, and the Joint Field Office (JFO). He is further 
expected to synchronize DoD/JTF-CS capabilities with JFO requirements and provide 
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Non DoD Agencies DoD Agencies Other Agencies International 
Representatives 
• Dept of Homeland 
Security 
o Sr. DHS 
Rep (SES) 
* 
o FEMA * 
o CBP/AMO 
* 
o TSA * 
o USCG * 
• U.S. Public Health 
Service * 
• FBI * 




• U.S. Dept of 
Agriculture 
• Director of National 
Intelligence * 
• Central Intelligence 
Agency * 
• Department of State 
* 
• Federal Aviation 
Admin* 
• Department of 
Interior (U.S. 
Geological Service, 
Bureau of Land 
Management) 
• Department of 
Energy * 









• Navy Sea Systems 
* 
• Naval Surface 
Warfare Center * 
• Office of Naval 
Intelligence * 





• National Geospatial 
Agency * 
• Naval Criminal 
Investigative 
Services * 
• National Air and 
Space Intelligence 
Center * 
• Missile Defense 
Agency* 
• Joint Theater Air 
and Missile Defense 
Organization* 
• Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency* 
• Dept of Veterans 
Affairs 
• Defense Planning 
and Operations* 










• U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers* 
• National Guard 
Bureau* 
 


















Assn of American 
Railroads) 









(Sandia, Oak Ridge, 
etc.) 
 
• Canada Command 
Liaison Office  
• Canadian 
Department of 
Public Safety & 
RCMP 
• Mexican Civil 
Response/Protectio
n Organizations  
• Mexican Military 
Command 
Table 2. NORTHCOM JIACG Members119 
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The business of the LNO is always tenuous. While he represents an agency, he is 
not empowered to change policy or, in most cases, commit resources. This is 
compounded when the LNO is representing an agency within an agency. For example, 
the NG LNO is not the DoD LNO. However, NGB is part of DoD. Additionally, agency 
LNOs have to be adequately staffed to influence the organization. Single LNOs function 
more as meeting organizers and are unable to provide planning and direct coordination 
support in a continuous manner.120 
The success of an interagency liaison officer, even in an informal structure, is 
seen in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), where a representative of the State 
Department’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance works with the SOUTHCOM staff 
during planning for disaster assistance. During contingencies, the LNO serves as a focal 
point to ensure coordination of assets and NGO capabilities. Though informal and ad hoc, 
this arrangement has proven to facilitate engagement and relief operations and is a 
starting point for a more structured institutional solution.121 
1. Current NGB Liaison Structure 
The National Guard currently has liaison officers working with multiple federal 
agencies as well as multiple agencies, commands, and directorates within DoD. The 
National Guard LNO must represent and facilitate the interaction between that agency 
and the National Guard at the NGB level and, indirectly, with 50 National Guards in 
sovereign states and territories. In some cases, these liaison operations are structured and 
memorialized. In others, they are ad hoc based on reaction to an event or emerging issue. 
For example, there is a structured NG liaison cell at NORTHCOM headquarters. 
However, the NG presence at Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region is borne 
by the single representative from the District of Columbia National Guard on a temporary 
assignment. Because of the decentralization of the LNO control, the designated LNOs are 
not made fully aware of on-going projects and initiatives between NGB and DHS. This  
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decentralization also contributes to incomplete communications processes. This leaves 
the LNOs and NGB with an incomplete picture of requirements and opportunities for 
enhancing interagency collaboration.  
The current NGB homeland security LNO structure is functionally based and 
decentralized. Different staff sections within the NGB Joint Staff have assigned staff 
members to agencies in an ad hoc manner based on that section’s requirements and 
resources. Since the LNO assignments are not centrally managed, there is a lack of 
coordinated effort. LNOs may discover each other’s activities as a matter of 
happenstance: they may encounter each other at a meeting within the agency.122 
The NG LNO process is also not centrally managed. Assigned by different staff 
sections, in many cases the assignments are not screened to insure that the liaison officer 
(LNO) has the background to function in the external agency environment. 
Decentralization of the LNO staff has also led to incomplete communications across the 
LNOs concerning current NGB and DoD initiatives and policy directions. This 
contributes to misinformation as LNOs are not aware of the most current efforts 
underway in other agencies.123  
The extent of the relationship between NGB and DHS is determined by the 
leadership within the two agencies.124 If the National Guard is going to fully embrace the 
homeland security mission, then they need to fully engage with DHS so that their efforts 
are synchronized with DHS’s efforts and capabilities requirements. It does not serve the 
Guard well to independently develop HS resources while DHS develops similar 
resources. Ultimately, the result is competition for missions and funding.125 
Currently, the NGB LNO at DHS Headquarters is tasked with facilitating the flow 
of information between NGB and DHS. This position specifically coordinates the policy  
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level interaction. The operational level interaction takes place at the agencies within 
DHS. For example, a NG LNO has been assigned to the FEMA Operations 
Directorate.126  
The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) requires a continual contact with the 
National Guard Joint Operations Center. This is achieved in a virtual sense by using the 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), integrated communications platform, 
email, and telephone contact between the NGB JOC and the DoD desk at the NOC.127 
This proves effective for maintaining situational awareness. However, the absence of a 
NG representative does not continuously incorporate the NG into planning or resource 
utilization.  
At NORTHCOM, the DoD focal point for domestic operations, the National 
Guard advisory staff consists of four officers and a non-commissioned officer. There are 
over forty other Guard personnel assigned at NORTHCOM, but all have been assimilated 
into task areas and operations within the command not specifically related to Guard 
capabilities.128 The liaison effort at NORTHCOM, despite a structured presence, has not 
resulted in closely coordinated interagency efforts between NGB and the command. 
Agency leadership perspectives are effecting changes that show improvements, but 
presence is not always an indicator of effectiveness.129,130 Recognizing this potential 
disconnect between National Guard and active duty forces, the NDAA has directed DoD 
to re-assess NORTHCOM’s staff for opportunities to increase Guard and reserve 
presence. Additionally, NDAA requires that a Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM be a 
NG General Officer. 
The Department of Defense has recognized the importance of interagency 
coordination and has established doctrine that includes specific mechanisms. The JIACG 
is the most comprehensive, focusing on bringing external agencies into an organization 
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focused on supporting the combatant commander and his mission. The NORTHCOM 
JIACG is particularly critical because NORTHCOM’s mission is to support the civilian 
authorities, largely represented by the agencies on the JIACG. The National Guard has no 
comparable mechanism and could benefit from a structured long-term interaction with 
other homeland security agencies. 
Liaison officers (LNO) are widely used by DoD and National Guard Bureau to 
provide expertise and representation at organizations within DoD and outside agencies. 
Units working in shared areas of responsibility will typically exchange LNOs to help 
insure communications and understanding of each other’s missions. DoD has extended 
LNOs to homeland security agencies as well. However, their focus is coordination of 
active duty/Title 10 missions. The National Guard has established a homeland security 
liaison effort, but it lacks the depth or coverage to benefit the broad new responsibilities 
faced by NGB and each State Guard. The liaison staff is also not centrally managed to 
maximize their presence. A liaison organization, coordinated with an NGB JIACG, will 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING NGB 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
Identified as the number one priority for the National Guard, homeland security, 
to include catastrophic disaster preparation, continues to be a focus for the transformation 
of Guard forces and missions.131 To meet the extensive nationwide preparedness and 
response requirements faced by the Department of Defense and the National Guard, they 
must have extensive direct interagency (IA) coordination, collaboration, cooperation 
authority, and mechanisms. The failure of interagency coordination was noted during 
Katrina to contribute to inefficient resource use, and ineffective allocation of assets, 
leading to life-threatening delays in early stages of the response and recovery phases of 
the disaster. Increased efficiency and effectiveness for these critical missions demand 
comprehensive interagency relationship. NGB interagency coordination should include a 
direct relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies 
operationally involved with homeland security. The Commission on National Guard and 
Reserve, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) 
have recently directed increased IA coordination between DoD, NGB, and civilian 
agencies.132 
Two potential mechanisms to improve that interagency coordination are the Joint 
Interagency Coordinating Group and centralizing liaison efforts in a Homeland Security 
Liaison Element. An additional consideration is to align NG equities at the regional level 
with the FEMA regional response organization. A final consideration is to refocus 
NORTHCOM to better integrate the interagency role. To limit the scope of this study, the 
focus of the thesis will be on the first three areas with only brief discussion of the 
NORTHCOM restructuring.   
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A. NGB JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATING GROUP (JIACG) 
The National Guard responds annually to thousands of requests for local and 
regional support that do not reach the level of a Stafford Act request for DoD resources. 
These routine responses include support from other non-DoD federal agencies — most 
notably the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Because of this regular 
response as a state resource, the Guard must maintain interagency relationships — 
particularly with DHS. To accomplish this, the National Guard has to develop 
mechanisms to insure that interagency relationships and operational constructs are in 
place.  
The National Guard Bureau (NGB) should establish an NGB Joint Interagency 
Coordinating Group (JIACG). The JIACG potentially brings the NGB a broader 
understanding of the operating environment and the range of response options available. 
It provides a more in-depth situational awareness as well as a capability to reach back in a 
timely manner to fill in or enhance information needs. 
The Guard has continuous monitoring and analysis responsibilities across a broad 
range of counterterrorist activities. To support these activities, the Guard needs 
information that: 1) helps prepare to save lives and property and recover critical 
infrastructure and the economy, 2) provides detection, assessment, and warning to 
prepare for protective action against terrorist attacks within the homeland, 3) supports 
their understanding of tactics, techniques, capabilities, and intentions of terrorists to assist 
in developing protective responses for the homeland, and 4) provides assistance in 
coordinating the response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies. A 
lesson learned from a national exercise in 2007 (Ardent Sentry) is that there is still no 
general common operating picture (COP). All the agencies continue to operate semi-
autonomously with field level operations driving operational reaction. A JIACG could 
serve as a mechanism to work through these types of problems.133 
Due to a policy innovation from the Department of Defense, the Joint Interagency 
Coordinating Group (JIACG) is designed as a lead organization within a major command 
that provides oversight, coordination, and synchronization of multiple agencies’ 
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activities, relative to that command.134 JIACGs have existing doctrine and policy and 
have demonstrated success in IA environments.135 The JIACG would be the core 
coordinating body for National Guard interagency planning and response at the national 
level for domestic operations.136 
The mission of the JIACG will be to initiate and synchronize interagency (IA) 
activities and information exchange to insure unity of effort. The JIACG will support 
operational planning and initiatives, maintaining interagency situational awareness; 
conduct IA capability assessments; and provide IA reachback. As necessary, the JIACG 
will form working groups for specific disciplines (law enforcement, medical, and other 
disciplines) or address specific threats (pandemic flu, hurricane response, and other 
threats). JIACG strategies and operating procedures should be established collaboratively 
with the JIACG partners. 
The NGB JIACG should attempt to mirror the NORTHCOM JIACG to encourage 
and simplify coordination and align the organizations for response planning and 
synchronization as responses grow beyond regional operations or incorporate non-
National Guard DoD assets. Use of an existing model and expertise available to consult 
on start-up strategies will also simplify the initiation of the JIACG. Modeling a successful 
organization will also enhance understanding of partners who may be asked to participate 
in both groups. However, an NGB JIACG should focus on the operational level of 
interagency relationships. For example, DHS is a federal department and interacts at the 
policy level with DoD. FEMA is an operational element within DHS that works routinely 
with NGB during operations.137 The JIACG should be adequately funded and resourced 
to establish the group and allow time for the group to form and mature. The group will 
become more effective over a multi-year period. 
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Figure 5.   NGB Interagency Coordination Directorate 
 
When activated for exercises or events, the JIACG will become an Interagency 
Coordination Center (ICC) to provide non-NGB perspective to the CNGB and Joint Staff. 
It will also insure that civilian agency response activities are tracked in the common 
operating picture to enhance planning and anticipating of resource requirements. The ICC 
will work as part of the command structure. It will support both current operations to 
maintain visibility of operations underway and future operations to provide planning 
inputs. The JIACG should be co-located with the NGB Joint Operations Center in the 
Washington, DC area to enhance NGB operational integration, streamline the ICC 
implementation, and simplify federal agency participation. 
To minimize any influences or screening from other staff section, the JIACG will 
be staffed and directed by an independent staff directorate reporting directly to the Chief 
of the National Guard Bureau. This also allows the JIACG to reach across other staff 
sections to accomplish its mission. Consideration should also be given to using a senior 
DoD civilian for the director of the interagency effort. This brings the civilian 
perspective, an essential function of the IA mission, to the IA effort. The civilian can 
interact more readily with other non-DoD agencies and it eliminates rank-based pressure 
on the IA director.138 
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1. NGB JIACG Organization 
Determining the organization and membership of the NGB JIACG is key to its 
effectiveness and ultimate usefulness. The decision of who should be represented on the 
group is not doctrinally established. Multiple factors, including frequency of interaction 
and criticality of relationships all need to be considered. Additionally, because NGB is an 
agency within the DoD, policy role (DoD) vs. operational role has to be a primary 
factor.139  
The make-up of the group should be focused on operational level response, 
deferring to the NORTHCOM JIACG and DoD liaisons for policy level discussion and 
coordination. As such, the NGB JIACG representatives would constitute a subset of the 
NORTHCOM JIACG, representing the operational and response entities expected to 
interact in a regional response not reaching the Stafford Act threshold. The organization 
and operation of the NGB JIACG should reflect DoD policy and NORTHCOM 
operational design to maximize interaction and coordination between the groups.  
One approach for JIACG participation is to look at the likely agencies that the 
National Guard will coordinate with to meet their responsibilities under the National 
Response Framework. This model assumes that a regional response, regardless of 
Stafford Act declaration, will be managed using the National Response Framework as a 
matter of best practice. The Framework organizes federal assistance into 15 Emergency 
Support Functions (ESF), Table 6. which details purpose, capabilities, and 
responsibilities (Coordinating Agency, Primary Agency(s), and Supporting Agencies). 
The Department of Defense is listed as a supporting agency for all Emergency Support 







                                                  














Table 3. EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 
 
2. National Guard Essential Capabilities 
The National Preparedness Goal lists 36 target capabilities that are expected to be 
developed and maintained by regions or states. The National Guard can support all 36 
target capabilities; however they have developed specific capabilities for 25 of them. 
Those specific capabilities are highlighted in the National Preparedness Target 
Capabilities List below.140 The 25 capabilities being developed by the NG are then 
further sorted into the ESFs with the Coordinating and Primary Agency (s) 
responsibilities detailed. The National Preparedness Target Capabilities List or 36 target 
capabilities is as follows: 
1. Animal Health Emergency Support; 
2. Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) 
Detection, (ESF 10 – EPA/USCG);  
3. Citizen Preparedness and Participation;  
4. Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection, (ESF 5 – 
FEMA), (ESF 13 – DOJ); 
5. Critical Infrastructure Protection, (ESF 13 – DOJ);   
                                                 
140 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 
2005), 7. 
ESF #1 – Transportation 
ESF #2 – Communications 
ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering 
ESF #4 – Firefighting 
ESF #5 – Emergency Management 
ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, 
 Housing, and Human  
ESF #7 – Resource Support 
ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services 
ESF #9 – Search and Rescue 
ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response 
ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources 
ESF #12 – Energy 
ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security 
ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery 
ESF #15 – External Affairs 
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6. Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution, (ESF 6 – FEMA); 
7. Economic and Community Recovery, (ESF 14 – FEMA);  
8. Emergency Operations Center Management, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
9. Emergency Public Information and Warning;  
10. Environmental Health and Vector Control; 
11. Explosive Device Response Operations;  
12. Fatality Management;  
13. Firefighting Operations/Support, (ESF 4 – USDA/USFS);  
14. Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense;  
15. Information Collection and Threat Recognition, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
16. Information Sharing and Collaboration, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
17. Intelligence Fusion and Analysis, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
18. Interoperable Communications, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
19. Isolation and Quarantine; 
20. Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services), (ESF 6 – 
FEMA); 
21. Mass Prophylaxis, (ESF 8 – HHS), (ESF 6 – FEMA); 
22. Medical Supplies Management and Distribution, (ESF 6 – FEMA), 
(ESF 8 – HHS); 
23. Medical Surge, (ESF 8 – HHS); 
24. On-Site Incident Management, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
25. Planning, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
26. Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and Laboratory Testing; 
27. Public Safety and Security Response, (ESF 13 – DOJ); 
28. Restoration of Lifelines, (ESF 3 – Corps of Engineers); 
29. Risk Analysis, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
30. Search and Rescue, (ESF 9 – DoD); 
31. Structural Damage Assessment and Mitigation, (ESF 3 – Corps of 
Engineers);  
32. Terrorism Investigation and Intervention;  
33. Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment, (ESF 8 – HHS); 
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34. Volunteer Management and Donations;  
35. WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination, (ESF 10 
– EPA/USCG);  
36. Worker Health and Safety, (ESF 8 – HHS). 
 
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is committed to providing what, he 
terms, the “essential 10” capabilities for homeland readiness.141 Central to each state’s 
preparation is to identify the critically essential organizations, equipment, and training 
that would be necessary to accomplish the full range of potential missions here in 
America. To achieve this, ten capabilities have been initially established in each state. 
The NG “essential 10” capabilities for homeland readiness can be cross-matrixed against 
the ESF structure. The National Guard Essential Capabilities are as follows: 
1. State Joint Force Headquarters for command and control, (ESF 5 – 
FEMA); 
2. Civil Support Team for chemical, biological, and radiological detection, 
(ESF 10 – EPA/USCG); 
3. Engineering assets, (ESF 3 – Corps of Engineers); 
4. Communications, (ESF 2 – FEMA);  
5. Ground transportation, (ESF 6 – FEMA);  
6. Aviation, (ESF 5 – FEMA); 
7. Medical capability, (ESF 8 – HHS);  
8. Security forces, (ESF 13 – DOJ);  
9. Logistics, (ESF 6 – FEMA); and  
10. Maintenance, (ESF 6 – FEMA).142 
 
By looking at the responsible agencies involved in each of the 25 National 
Preparedness Target Capabilities focused on by the National Guard and the NG 10  
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Essential Capabilities, we are able to develop a list of operational agencies that the Guard 
would be utilizing. The capabilities-based model leads to the inclusion of the following 








A similar analysis structure can be used to detail non-federal agency participants. 
Some level of representation by DoD, specifically the NORTHCOM operational 
Joint Task Forces (JTF), should also be represented to integrate planning and coordinate 
response. These task forces, JTF-Civil Support, JTF-North, JTF-Alaska, and JTF 
National Capital Region, are standing organizations prepared to lead Title 10 responses to 
specific areas or types of incidents.  
B. NGB HOMELAND SECURITY LIAISON ELEMENT 
To coordinate external relationships with civilian federal agencies, The National 
Guard Bureau should also establish a robust, centrally organized liaison management 
mechanism — a Homeland Security Liaison Element (HSLE). The HSLE should be 
organized as a section within the Joint Staff at NGB. It would provide a central focus for 
LNO assignments and communications with civilian federal agencies at the national and 
regional levels.143 
The HSLE would be a component of the Interagency Coordination Directorate 
(Figure 5). This would centralize all interagency activities within this single staff 
directorate. Similar to a Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE), the HSLE would 
coordinate, deconflict, and integrate NG resources with other agencies operations. The 
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HSLE Director is not in the agency’s chain of command but accomplishes NG 
coordination by providing an NG presence and understanding of that agency.144 
Because the homeland security center of gravity is DHS, NGB should supplement 
the limited liaison presence there and centralize the control of those liaison officers. 
There are currently two officers representing the National Guard at DHS. One serves at 
DHS headquarters; the second serves at FEMA headquarters. They spend the majority of 
their time coordinating meetings and staff interactions between NGB and DHS. While 
this is an active relationship, the lack of personnel assigned prevents the in-depth 
planning and operational coordination that will support successful consequence 
management during America’s next catastrophic disaster. Agency LNOs have to be 
adequately staffed to influence the organization. Single LNOs are unable to provide 
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Figure 6.   Homeland Security Liaison Element 
 
There are nine areas where the NGB could support the homeland security effort 
by providing direct, continuous coordination with DHS (Figure 6). These are:  
• DHS HQ 
• FEMA HQ  
• FEMA Disaster Operations  
• FEMA National Preparedness (Exercises) 
• Customs and Border Protection (Field Operations)  
• Office of the Director of Operations Coordination (Incident Management 
and  Interagency Planning) 




• Office of the Undersecretary for National Protection and Programs (Cyber 
Security and Communications) and (Infrastructure Protection).146  
 
There are also number of DHS offices where an organized, routine interaction 
should take place, but do not require full-time engagement. These include: 
• The US Coast Guard   
• The Office of the Under Secretary for Science and Technology  
 (Command, Control, and Interoperability)  
• The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office  
• The Office for Health Affairs  
• The US Secret Service  
• The Office of Counter-Narcotics Enforcement.147 
 
There are additional areas within DHS where there are frequent, but not continual, 
interoperability requirements. An example is the use of NG resources by the U.S. Secret 
Service (USSS) during national special security events. While these agencies do not 
require full-time LNOs, an individual should be assigned to serve as an agency 
representative and maintain continuity in use of NG resources. Additionally, project-
specific action officers may be tasked for initiatives that can benefit from NG 
participation. An example is the Secure Borders Initiative at Customs and Border 
Protection. This will require additional LNO positions with multiple agency 
responsibilities.148 
1. Redundancy 
If implemented, a robust NGB presence will create a level of redundancy between 
DoD and NGB LNOs at DHS. While this thesis has demonstrated the mission 
differences, there are ultimately core similarities between resource types and capabilities 
that will generate conflict between Title 10 and NGB planning and response. This will be 
                                                 




confusing to the agencies where the two officers stand side by side with different 
concepts and authorities. Some level of conflict can be anticipated. 
To avoid this, DoD and NGB will have to insure that clear guidance is provided to 
the LNO staff. NDAA requirements will help with this process. Staff selection will need 
to include parameters concerning interagency cooperation traits. Interestingly, the LNO 
to FEMA Disaster Operations is assigned from NGB J3 to DoD JDOMS, who then 
assigns him to FEMA. This may be a construct that avoids duplicative NGB and DoD 
LNO requirements. However, it provides a knowledgeable representative relative to NG 
resources and capabilities.149 
Eventually the HSLE model could be expanded to a strategic alliance concept. 
The alliance would be established between the key response agencies; the Army Corps of 
Engineers (ACE), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the National Guard Bureau, and 
FEMA. NGB would provide a senior staff officer and staff at each agency with an 
additional senior staff officer at each FEMA region. These coordination elements would 
then interact directly with senior staff at each State Guard to insure coordination and 
collaboration is on-going at all levels.150   
C. AN ALTERNATIVE – ALIGNMENT OF NG COORDINATION WITH 
FEMA REGIONAL FOCUS  
While the focus of this paper has been to enhance interagency coordination at the 
national level, specifically the National Guard Bureau, there is an on-going process 
within the Department of Homeland Security to focus operationally at the regional level. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s regional structure represents the primary 
focus for that effort. This is a natural environment for the National Guard to focus its 
interagency coordination efforts.  
The HLS Act of 2002 legislated that DHS propose a framework for regional 
operations. The George Washington University (GWU) HLS Policy Institute (HLSPI) 
Task Force (TF) and the Heritage Foundation conducted a study of regional 
preparedness. They found that a regional effort was required to best utilize significant 
existing local and state capabilities. Further, they found that a regional approach would 
                                                 
149 Ryan, Interview. 
150 Aylward, Interview. 
70 
insure that the right resources were provided in the right place at the right time.151 The 
study determined that a strong regional structure, using FEMA Regional Directors, could 
conduct operations. This would leave the national government to stay focused on policy 
and “crisis management, “particularly in the event of multiple attacks across the country.” 
The study proposed that regional offices would “think broadly of anticipated needs 
during a crises by refocusing on the four categories of assistance; emergency services, 
infrastructure support, human services, and community recovery and mitigation that cut 
across all agencies and areas of government, rather than obsessing about narrowly drawn 
emergency support functions (ESF) or single agencies.” This regional effort should 
include regional offices with all relevant federal agencies and the National Guard, 
positioned together within current FEMA offices.152  
The GWU task force proposed regional offices that: 
1) Have the goal of enhanced preparedness coordination of state and local 
governments’ activities and federal agencies and working in key 
partnerships to identify critical gaps and communicate needs to DHS. 
2) Complement a more robust and effective ICS at all levels of government 
to integrate effectively with regional responders. 
3) Drive HLS professional development improvements, to include education, 
assignment, and accreditation requirements.153 
 
Passed in 2006, the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act includes provisions 
relating to FEMA's regional structure. It also provides a renewed focus on the regions as 
the backbone for FEMA's relationship with state and local partners. This is an essential 
element for successful emergency management. Recognizing that disasters have a 
regional impact and disaster management requires regional efforts and resources. FEMA 
is also expanding capabilities at the regional level. It is increasing regional staff to insure 
interoperability and support. FEMA's 10 Regional Directors became Regional 
                                                 
151 Homeland Security Policy Institute, Regionalizing Homeland Security: Unifying National 
Preparedness and Response, George Washington University (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006). 
152 Ibid.  
       153 Peter J. Quinn, Joint Intergovernmental-Interagency Coordination Group and Task Force Approach 
      to Military Support to Civilian Authorities, U.S. Army War College, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania, May 2007).  
71 
Administrators.154 It is FEMA’s intent that their regional operations be the essential field 
component that is interacting directly with state and local governments.155 
DoD has established support at the FEMA regional offices for defense support to 
civilian authorities (DSCA). A primary defense official is designated in each region, the 
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who is supported by a Defense Coordinating 
Element (DCE). Typically, the DCO and DCE are not assigned full-time to the FEMA 
regional offices, working at alternate locations in other primary assignments. These 
positions are supported by Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) at the 
regional and state levels who work with the emergency management structures to support 
and coordinate DoD requests for assistance. The EPLOs are reserve officers on-call for 
emergencies. 
This local and regional response makes regional coordination a logical focal point 
for National Guard planning and operational coordination. Events extending beyond 
regional support will require additional DoD assets and coordination. That coordination is 
being planned at NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM has an existing program to facilitate 
coordination with the states. The State Engagement Program reaches out to establish 
relationships with the state emergency management agencies to prepare to provide DSCA 
support — if required. In many cases, this is redundant to the existing National Guard 
DSCA effort and structure within the state.156 A considered approach, therefore, is to 
leverage NORTHCOM to provide the national level of DSCA support, while focusing 
National Guard assets at the regional level.157 
Regional coordination takes the various states’ operational plans into effect. 
Using either the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) or existing 
memorandums of understanding between states or elements of state government, the 
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state’s National Guards have planned for sharing resources with neighboring and/or 
nearby states. Many states have existing memorandums of agreement that coordinate the 
use of neighboring states’ Guard resources.158 For example, the State of Maryland has an 
MOU between the National Guards of Maryland, the District of Columbia, Virginia, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.159 Beyond those MOUs, National Guard 
Bureau serves as an EMAC coordinator for states requesting Guard support. This NGB 
coordinating role is enhanced in the NDAA.  
1. Regional Definition 
An immediate question is “What regions should be used?” Four considerations 
encompass the argument. First, the various states have established relationships between 
their Guards via an MOU. These associations may be decades old and are exercised or 
renewed with regular contact between the neighboring states. This grouping may be a 
floating target, however, as the states have multiple relationships depending on 
geographic area. 
Second, natural regions exist based on geography and common challenges. An 
example is the Delmarva Peninsula, an area that includes parts of Delaware, Maryland, 
and Virginia. The peninsula lies between the Atlantic Ocean and the Chesapeake Bay and 
is a frequently threatened by hurricanes which would affect all three states.  
A third basis encompasses regions already required by federal law or grant 
guidance. These include Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) for regional 
transportation systems, environmental regions, and Urban Area Security Initiative 
(UASI) areas used for regional emergency preparedness funding by DHS. These regions 
tend to be urban focused, which addresses risk, but excludes significant threats and 
portions of the population.160 
But the fourth regional consideration is the most compelling, and that is to 
organize within the current FEMA regional structure. This is where FEMA and DoD are 
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already dedicating their planning and organizing efforts and resources. This provides an 
existing framework that is being expanded for the states to work within. This is not ideal. 
This is because the regions are very large and may not encompass all of the natural or 
existing relationships. However, the existing NG relationships within the regions can be 
expanded.161  
 
Figure 7.   FEMA Regions 
 
2. Regional Support Structure  
The regional support structure becomes the basic building block for National 
Guard regional operational coordination. Representatives from the National Guard 
Bureau, and each state’s JFHQ, would be represented at each regional headquarters. This 
would support the command processes and anticipating resource requirements. These 
state representatives will also have knowledge of state and local plans to insure 
coordination and anticipation of resource requirements.162 
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In the event of an emergency or contingency within a state which exceeds the 
state’s capabilities, regional resources could be drawn upon to provide immediate 
assistance. The regional coordination cell would have anticipated requirements. This 
would be both in planning and real time continuous assessment of the on-going incident. 
It would also be leaning forward to provide additional NG resources and command and 
control support to the state command structure. The cell would have the current operating 
picture on all of the federal efforts underway at the FEMA regional operations center and 
would be able to deconflict requests for Guard assets. This would gain criticality with 
incidents involving, or potentially involving, multiple states (large scale natural or 
manmade disasters) or during multiple incidents in multiple states (terrorist acts).  
3. Staff Support 
Establishing regional NG support at each FEMA region will require additional 
resources. Adequate staffing will be needed for continuous operations and interagency 
coordination, as well as a surge capability to accommodate contingencies. To insure 
continuity and unbiased contingency management, this staff should represent each state 
Guard in the region and a leadership element not affiliated directly with the states. The 
team will conduct planning with a focus on integration of state plans and capabilities. 
This would extend across a regional support framework.  
Staff would consist of active duty (Title 10 and 32) service members and 
traditional (part-time reserve) National Guard personnel as well. This would particularly 
provide the surge capability. Additionally, each region should have an established liaison 
with NGB. To support that, NGB should designate an LNO to each of these offices and 
the National Capital Region.163 An existing resource that could be utilized to help staff 
this regional coordination would be to convert the reserve Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers (EPLO) to Title 32 positions with full time planning and coordination 
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D. RESTRUCTURING NORTHCOM  
In a rapidly evolving homeland security environment, an additional opportunity 
has emerged to improve interagency coordination between the civilian sector and DoD. 
U.S. Northern Command could be restructured as an interagency organization. While not 
explored in depth in this thesis, this bears recognition because of its potential impact on 
an NGB JIACG or HSLE. 
NORTHCOM was established to address DoD operations in the continental 
United States. The primary mission is homeland defense and DSCA. Recognizing that 
DoD will always be in support of civil authorities, the traditional use of the term C2, 
Command and Control, has been replaced at NORTHCOM by Collaborate and 
Coordinate.165 However, NORTHCOM will never reach a full-depth of experience or 
understanding of defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) with its current staffing 
model. The nature of active duty military assignments rotates personnel every three years. 
The warfight emphasis will move personnel back to other non-DSCA assignments. This 
leads to a lack of continuity when working in an environment that is an established career 
field for the civilian sector. NORTHCOM works to overcome this lack of experience and 
continuity through the use of contractors and civilian personnel. 
DoD has limited DSCA experience, and specific limited authorities under Title 
10, to operate within the United States. These shortcomings can be supplemented by 
civil-military integration at NORTHCOM. This is a major change in mission that would 
require changes to the White House-directed Unified Command Plan. However, in light 
of the NDAA direction to NORTHCOM to analyze its make-up, the timing may be right. 
Despite their mission and the capability of the National Guard, there is limited 
National Guard or civilian agency presence or leadership at NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM 
should be restructured to integrate the National Guard and civilian homeland defense and 
security agencies. The National Guard can provide the DSCA expertise in depth, and 
representation of civilian emergency agencies. Specifically, DHS/FEMA can insure 
integrated planning and response with the civilian sector.  
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U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a new combatant command, is intended to 
be an organization that focuses on prevention of conflicts in the region through the 
combined use of humanitarian aid, diplomacy, and counterterrorism operations. 
AFRICOM is proposed to be composed of up to 25% non-defense civilians, with an 
Ambassador-level civilian from the State Department serving as a Deputy 
Commander.166 NORTHCOM could take a similar approach, using DHS and other 
federal agencies with homeland security roles as partners within the command.  
Another consideration is the restructuring of NORTHCOM — not as a combatant 
command — but as a standing Joint Interagency Task Force: Homeland Security (JIATF-
HS). The Task Force could be patterned after the successful drug interdiction task force, 
JIATF South. JIATF South is composed of the five military services and nine civilian 
agencies. They all work in the same command structure to interdict drug traffic entering 
into the U.S. JIATF-HS would be similarly composed of all of the DoD and civilian 
agencies with responsibilities for homeland security.167 
With the renewed focus on interagency collaboration, it is clear that a more 
focused IA or liaison structure would enhance the National Guard’s capability and 
preparedness. The establishment of a NG Joint Interagency Coordination Group and a 
Homeland Security Liaison Element are two functional organizational tools that would 
support that effort. More broadly, a regional focus and structures to support that focus 
will integrate NG planning and operations more closely with the direction being taken by 
DHS/FEMA.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Identified as the number one priority for the National Guard, homeland security, 
including catastrophic disaster preparation, continues to be a focus for the transformation 
of Guard forces and missions.168 This transformation was tested during Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita when 50,000 National Guard (NG) soldiers and airmen were deployed 
to assist threatened and stricken areas. Because domestic operations is a civilian support 
mission for the National Guard (NG), it is critical that there be interagency coordination 
and communications to plan for requirements, integrate response, and maintain 
situational awareness concerning agency capabilities, status, and initiatives. Under 
current policy, NGB lacks the mandate to provide direct liaison with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in preparation for National Guard operations during 
emergencies.  
Interagency relationships are key to successful disaster response. Understanding 
the capabilities of different agencies at all levels of government, and the process to access 
them, is a core element of emergency management. The lack of comprehensive 
interagency coordination is counterproductive for agencies that rely on each other so 
extensively during response efforts. The Department of Defense (DoD) must improve 
interagency coordination and integration. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) must 
improve their existing efforts to insure that coordination results in collaboration at 
national, regional, and state levels. The National Guard (NG) is positioned and capable to 
provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in an efficient and effective 
manner. Without the mandate and support to collaborate directly with federal response 
partners, the effort is subject to changing priorities within DoD. 
The National Guard is a unique and flexible tool that is available to both the 
states’ and federal governments for domestic operations. The Guard has a long history of 
domestic operations. It is actively working and planning with local, state, and federal 
partners to remain prepared to conduct the full range of possible domestic operations now 
and into the future. In 23 states, the Adjutant General also serves as the state’s emergency 
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manager, interacting directly with DHS. These state planning and operational 
relationships should be institutionalized at the National Guard Bureau. 
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 and its embedded elements of 
the National Guard Empowerment Act has set the stage to address these reforms. So has 
the focus brought by the Commission on National Guard and Reserves Final Report to 
the issues of National Guard structure and homeland security. It is incumbent on the 
agencies involved, specifically DoD and the National Guard Bureau, to reengineer the 
best way to prepare for and deliver consequence management in an integrated, 
interagency manner. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary question explored by this thesis is: what additional procedural, 
policy, and structural mechanisms can be implemented to improve interagency 
cooperation and collaboration between the National Guard Bureau and other homeland 
security agencies for domestic operations? The recommendations are as follows: 
1. Recommendation #1 
The National Guard Bureau should create an Interagency Coordinating 
Directorate (ICD). The Directorate will staff a Joint Interagency Coordinating Group to 
support NG planning and responses which do not reach the Stafford Act level. This 
concept is currently under review at NGB.169 Using the NORTHCOM JIACG as a model 
to insure continuity of effort, the JIACG will also function as an Interagency 
Coordination Center within the NGB JOC structure during exercises and crises 
operations. This will take advantage of planning efforts and communications channels 
created within the JIACG. The JIACG should be co-located with the NGB Joint 
Operations Center (JOC) to promote communications and coordination.  
Because policy is conducted at the federal departmental level, the NGB JIACG 
structure should be focused on operational coordination. Membership should be a 
function of the National Guard’s capabilities and agencies that those capabilities 
frequently support. The core agency list must include: FEMA, DOJ, HHS, DoD/ACE, 
EPA, USCG, and USDA/USFS.  
 
                                                 
169 Tennis, Interview, May 11, 2007. 
79 
2. Recommendation #2 
A Homeland Security Liaison Element should also be created at National Guard 
Bureau. Working within the ICD, the HSLE will consolidate all current liaison efforts 
with other homeland security agencies. This will provide unity of command and effort 
and improve communications between liaison officers and the NGB leadership and staff. 
The liaison officers should also be empowered to represent NGB on operational and 
planning issues. Further, the LNOs should be staffed adequately to allow fuller 
engagement with the agency. 
3. Recommendation #3 
The National Guard will be fully engaged in any state level response. Under the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and state-to-state memorandums 
of understanding (MOU), it will be widely utilized at the regional level. National level 
response will normally require Title 10 forces and will be coordinated by NORTHCOM. 
To enhance response planning and operations, the Guard should adopt and institutionalize 
a regional disaster response organizational structure. This regional focus will complement 
the direction taken by FEMA and supported by DoD. Adopting a regional focus will 
support NG preparedness and operational effectiveness. 
4. Recommendation #4 
NORTHCOM has been given a unique mission to provide command and control 
to Title 10 forces operating in the American homeland. This civil-military mission can 
best be accomplished by fully collaborative efforts between the agencies responsible for 
preparedness in the U.S. NORTHCOM should examine its structure for opportunities for 
staff and command integration with the National Guard and Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).   
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research needs to be conducted in numerous areas concerning interagency 
coordination for homeland security. Some specific areas include: 
• Agency structure for homeland security interagency cooperation and 
collaboration. Current efforts center on adopting existing organizational 
structure rather than looking at the new requirements and taking a ‘square-
one’ reengineering approach.  
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• Staff development for homeland security interagency roles. Domestic 
operations have previously focused on civil-military models. The renewed 
focus calls for expertise specific to working within the National Response 
Framework. Already experienced in this area, the National Guard should 
take the lead and build a bullpen for disaster surge capacity.170 Two other 
considerations for increasing the competence of military staff assigned to 
domestic operations positions would be specialized training and career 
paths for domestic operations assignments. An additional or special skill 
identifiers (ASI/SSI), or career functional area for domestic operations, 
could be created.171 
• Government interagency collaboration models have not been fully 
effective. There is strong emphasis on cooperation, but the long standing 
interagency competition is preventing cross-cutting collaboration. Joint 
planning must include shared resources and unity of effort. 
• Mechanisms for information sharing need to be developed to insure that 
all agencies have a common operating picture. The challenge will be the 
ability for the multiple agencies to be able to automatically identify and 
share the critical data being collected in their systems.   
 
C. CHALLENGES 
No discussion of organizational change can be conducted without recognition of 
the existing structures, relationships, and political climate that challenge any proposals. 
While the National Guard has made dramatic moves to enhance its capabilities to support 
national preparedness, it has not been without problems. Internal resistance to the concept 
of a joint force headquarters took some years to overcome. Even more entrenched was 
resistance to the concept that the Guard should embrace homeland security as a priority 
mission. This is considered prioritization of the state mission over the federal mission and 
it entails redirection of resources. Taking anything away from the federal wartime 
mission can be viewed as counterproductive to the Guard’s position in DoD. The Guard 
has overcome the internal resistance to accept the changes needed to begin to transition to                                                  
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a more effective homeland security force. Continued evolution will occur as the 
comprehensive homeland security mission is fully accepted by the Guard and DoD. 
DoD and the DoD Joint Staff understand the expectations of the country for the 
military to use its vast resources to support domestic operations. The tension in the 
military services relative to domestic operations lies at the service-specific departments: 
Army, Air Force, and Navy. This resistance is a function of philosophical differences in 
what the mission of the military should be, the current operations tempo in the Global 
War on Terrorism, and the lack of funding directed at domestic operations. The 
acceptance of the domestic operations mission will likely be a generational issue.172 
Some additional challenges are: 
• The National Guard is part of DoD and DoD is the policy level agency 
expected to represent the National Guard at DHS and other federal 
agencies. The Department of Defense is focused on homeland defense and 
DSCA secondary to Stafford Act requests. This focus fails to recognize 
the scope of homeland security involvement by the National Guard.  
• The National Guard Bureau does not have the authority or charter to 
conduct federal interagency coordination. However, the Commission on 
National Guard and Reserve has recommended that this be changed and 
Congress included it in the NDAA.  
• The expansion of the National Guard homeland security mission has not 
been universally embraced. It has occurred during a time when the NG is 
also evolving from a strategic reserve — used last during World War II — 
to an operational reserve heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Observations have been made that the current up-tempo of the Guard and 
reserve cannot be maintained. The concerns raised are that this 
fundamental change alone is substantial and the added emphasis on 
domestic operations detracts from funding and time needed to prepare for 
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federal deployments. Continuing to build a robust homeland security 
capability will increase the stress already felt by reserve units.173 
• There is a concern within the National Guard community that, if the Guard 
embraces the homeland security mission, they will become a constabulary 
— a military force used for police work here in the United States — and 
will no longer be a military reserve force. This would result in the loss of 
force structure, training, and equipment. In reality, the ongoing utilization 
and reorganization of the Guard as an operational reserve marginalizes 
that concern.174 
• Homeland security is a secondary mission for the National Guard at the 
state level and should never rise to the level of required interagency 
coordination at the federal level. This point fails to recognize the 
increasing federal involvement during state and regional level responses 
and the planning that should accompany response preparedness. 
• Each state National Guard is independent and operates under the 
command of the Governor. The friction occurs at the point that NGB 
provides federal interagency coordination external to the state NG 
coordination. NDAA has now authorized this coordination by NGB and 
will require clear policy and agreement among the states and NGB. 
• Funding for domestic operations is a major issue to be resolved before the 
National Guard and DoD can fully conduct the DSCA mission.  
• There is a misallocation of resources for homeland security coordination. 
NORTHCOM is resourced with over 1,500 staff personnel while FEMA 
and NGB are under-resourced. This fails to recognize that NORTHCOM 
is not the lead agency in responses within the United States. This could be 
addressed by restructuring the mission and composition of 
NORTHCOM.175 
 
                                                 
173 Defense Science Board, DSB Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and 
Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, Washington, D.C.: September 2007, 19. 
174 McKeague, Interview. 
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The leaders of our country and the public demand that the Guard be a relevant, 
reliable, and ready force. They can only meet those goals with an aggressive response 
during an incident. They must interact to a higher degree with the civilian response 
community. Understanding the civilian agencies’ processes, and anticipating areas where 
civilian resources will need support, will provide the planning focus required for success 
during a catastrophic emergency. 
Major responses require multi-agency communications and coordination, before 
during, and after an event. As the National Guard continues to advance its preparedness 
for domestic missions, interagency collaboration remains a key imperative for future 
success — and the saving of property and lives.   
 
 The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver; we 
will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and freedom 
will prevail. 
 
President George W. Bush 
October 7, 2001 
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